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1. Introduction  
 
26 March 2010, 21:22 – the South Korean Pohang-class corvette Cheonan patrolled along 
its usual route near Baengnyeongdo, in the coastal waters to the west of the Korean 
Peninsula. A fair evening, the calm sea was betrayed only by the cruising warships, bearing 
witness of the explosive situation that had been developing in this area for almost 60 years. 
Suddenly, the sound of an explosion ripped through the dusk. In a blast that sailors aboard 
the Cheonan would later describe as a feeling of being lifted in the air, the 88 metre ship 
was blown in half. Within an hour1, the Cheonan sank to the ground 24 metres beneath the 
surface, killing 46 members of its crew.2 In times of overall high tensions between the two 
nations claiming the peninsula as their own, the sinking of a warship near a disputed border 
could only mean a further deterioration of relations. The situation threatened to escalate, 
fuelling fears of a full-scale war between the two Koreas, a war that, given the recent 
nuclear endeavours undertaken by the North, could very likely have consequences for the 
whole planet. 
 
A year after the sinking of the Cheonan, the situation on the peninsula remains tense. The 
world has been spared an all out war, but recurring acts of aggression along the inter-
Korean maritime border are a constant reminder of the tinderbox that the Northern Limit 
Line (NLL), as the delimitation between North and South Korean in the Western Sea came 
to be called, presents to the world.  
 
The sinking was neither the first, nor the last incident surrounding this maritime 
delimitation. Ever since 1973, when the North first began questioning the validity of the 
NLL as a true maritime boundary, ships from both sides, both military and civilian, clashed 
in the Western Sea in an effort to prove their respective country’s claims over the territory 
in question. However, the Cheonan incident stands exemplary of the mixture of uncertainty, 
violence and propaganda that have shrouded the NLL ever since its inception in 1953, after 
the end of the Korean War. While the majority of the international community applauded 
the findings of an Independent Commission requested by South Korea on the incident, 
                                                 
1 Yonhap News Agency(2010): “S. Korean Navy ship sinking in the Yellow Sea”, Yonhap News Agency, on 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/03/26/18/0301000000AEN20100326008600320F.HTML, 
04.12.2011 
2 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 198) p22 
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putting the blame solely on Pyongyang, the North continues to dispute its complicity, 
backed by a second group of experts led by the Russian Federation.3 And reasons for doubt 
remain.4 As such, the incident is emblematic of inter-Korean relations as a whole. After 
decades of warming and cooling of relationships, a number of joint initiatives and 
declarations, border skirmishes and nuclear weapons tests, the two Koreas, states sharing a 
common history and culture, have yet to find measures that would support the climate of 
trust and confidence needed for a resolution of the conflict. Technically still at war since 
the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the two sides have over the years engaged 
in numerous confrontations that brought the peninsula to the brink of a full scale war. Both 
sides engage in extensive propaganda exercises, ranging from a self-righteous interpretation 
of history to large military manoeuvres involving international partners. Similar to such 
propaganda, the NLL is but one of a number of issues igniting open hostilities between the 
two sides. However, the NLL stands out among these issues as having, uncommonly often, 
caused particularly severe situations in recent years. 
 
1.1 The particularities of the NLL among other issues 
As mentioned, a number of issues, historic or present, have caused the two Koreas to 
exchange hostilities. Nevertheless, the NLL has proven to be a particularly long-standing 
issue, repeatedly leading the two sides to an exchange of deadly force.5 The main reasons 
for this lie in its nature as a geographical issue. While other instances such as allegations 
over historic wrongs, propagandistic advances or accusations of warmongering can be 
disregarded by one side or the other and eventually dissolve in a change to more friendly 
language, the issue of the NLL, as a geographic dispute, targets a major cornerstone of each 
state’s legitimacy – their territorial sovereignty. While one side stepping back from a 
propagandistic exchange of words would usually eventually prove beneficiary for both 
parties by ending in a more positive climate enabling substantive discussions, giving way in 
a territorial dispute holds much further and – particularly discouraging – irrevocable 
                                                 
3 Snyder, Scott/Byun, See-Won (2011): “Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North 
Korea’s Provocations”, in RUSI Journal 156, No. 2 (April 2011) p78 
4 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 198) p34 
5 While only a few of many, particularly severe incidents were the June 1999 first battle of Yeonpyeongdo, 
the June 2002 second battle of Yeonpyeongdo, the November 2009 battle of Daecheongdo and the 2010 
shelling of Yeonpyeongdo. Ibid. pp6-11, 16-22, 26-28. See also Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller 
Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine 
Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) pp143-146 
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implications for the acting side. In addition to the prospect of an irretrievable loss of 
claimed territory, the legitimacy of a country unable to defend sovereignty over parts of its 
area may be at question, especially when considering the unclear legal situation and 
generally fierce contest for legitimacy between the two Koreas. 
 
The question remains however why the territorial dispute in the West Sea has proven so 
much more contentious than other geographical issues, such as the sea border off the 
Eastern coast of the peninsula or indeed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separating the land 
forces of the two countries and marking the cease fire line decided upon in the 1953 
Armistice Agreement. One reason is its definition, or rather its lack of definition, as a sea 
border. Possibly not of much interest to Northern negotiators at the end of the war6, the sea 
borders were hardly given the same degree of attention as the establishment of the DMZ, 
thereby being open to contests of their legitimacy. In addition, even established sea borders 
remain difficult to fully control, presenting a stark contrast to the DMZ with its rigorous 
control regime on behalf of both sides. The Western Sea is also fundamentally different 
from the Eastern sea border. The territory in question, holding islands controlled by the 
South, access routes to Haeju bay as a strategically important port area as well as rich 
fishing grounds, is central to both sides’ economic interests, making a renouncement of 
claims by either side even less probable.  
 
The NLL will continue to play an important role in inter-Korean relations, and chances are 
high that any solution to the Korean question, be it peaceful or violent, will be influenced 
by decisions concerning the future of that maritime border delimitation, just as these 
decisions are influenced by the wider scope of issues on the peninsula. To evaluate and 
understand the importance the NLL may reach in the future it is necessary to understand the 
line itself, beginning from its historic origins during the Korean war, over politics and 
ideologies surrounding it today, to its implications in the regional and international 
dimensions. While no person can predict the future of the NLL or the Korean peninsula at 
large, a thorough analysis may still allow for an outlook on possible scenarios for the years 
to come. And if nothing else, it will shed some light on one of today’s international 
relations’ most inscrutable and most immediate issues – the last theatre of the cold war. 
 
                                                 
6 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 198) p2 
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1.2 A few words of explanation 
As this paper will attempt a historical, theoretical, legal and political analysis of the 
situation in the Korean Western Sea, it largely relies on both primary and secondary sources. 
As for the former, these mostly include historic and legal documents, news articles and 
official government communication. The latter include all kind of previously undertaken 
relevant scientific research focusing, amongst others, on history and politics of the Korean 
peninsula as a whole and the NLL in particular. This may be in the form of monographs, 
commentating articles or online sources. Maps are provided in Annex I to help conveying 
to the reader the geographic aspects of the theatre of the conflict, and also in underlining in 
detail certain ideas or conclusions. 
 
Both primary and secondary sources, however, need to be regarded with special care when 
employed for argumentation. As pointed out, the NLL, just like the whole issue of the 
Korean partition, is subject to a war of information, resulting in propaganda being issued by 
both sides and being reproduced and strengthened by authors either sympathetic to one side 
or the other or simply unaware of these circumstances. A holistic analysis of the issue at 
hand will hardly be possible without considering information provided by the parties to the 
conflict or representing a partisan stand on the conflict. Therefore, it is all the more 
important for the Reader to be conscious of these conditions, as it will enhance ones 
understanding of the issue. 
 
Such a balanced approach shall however not only apply to the sources utilized in 
argumentation for this study. In a region as contested as the Korean peninsula, the use of 
names and designation presents an equally complex challenge. As an example, this paper 
will refer to the parties to the conflict by their official designations, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), by their widely 
used designations North Korea and South Korea, or simply as the North or the South. It 
should be noted that the latter will all be used in capitals, owing to the fact that though the 
author accepts that both the DPRK and the ROK claim the whole of the Korean peninsula 
as their sovereign territory, and reunification of the Korean nation is the declared goal of 
both parties – as will be discussed in the chapters to follow – both have established 
sovereign Governments within the areas designated in the 1953 Armistice Agreement, 
notwithstanding certain unclarified issues such as the NLL. This also reflects international 
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practice after the simultaneous accession of both Governments as Member States to the 
United Nations. Other similar issues include, among others, reference to the waters 
penetrated by the NLL, which will be referred to, corresponding to international practice, as 
the Yellow Sea (instead of the term West Sea often employed by Koreans). Also, the island 
group situated adjacent to the NLL in the Yellow Sea will either be referred to by their 
names or as Northwest Islands, mirroring their geographic location as related to the South 
Korean mainland. In general the author tries to be coherent in the utilization of names and 
designations, and any instance of failure therein is of course the fault of the author only. 
 
As a consequence of the actuality of the topic, an impressive number of research papers 
have been published on issues pertaining to the peninsula, and also with particular focus on 
the NLL. Many of them provide very accurate descriptions of the major incidents which 
have catapulted the demarcation line into the general public’s consciousness. It is not the 
author’s intention to repeat these descriptions, for two reasons. First, many research papers 
on the issue are strikingly similar to each other. While of course every single peace of 
research helps to form a more complete understanding of the issue, it doesn’t seem 
necessary to repeat in such details what others have already described wider in scope and 
more in-depth than this present paper could offer. Instead, this paper should rather serve as 
a means to understand the circumstances, processes, and the interconnectedness of different 
elements pertaining to the NLL, and the Korean peninsula at large. 
 
2. Historical Origins of the NLL 
As with any other issue of geopolitical importance, to analyse the situation and conflict 
around the NLL, its present political ramifications and its possible future, it is of utmost 
importance to understand its origins and the developments which have taken place since 
then. This is easily explained, for the origin of a situation, the decisions that led to its 
emergence and the historical context they were taken in more often than not provides an 
explanation for the way actors involved view the very same issue at present. And even if it 
fails to do so, if present constellations run contrary to what would be expected from 
examining a situation’s origin, the answer is most likely to be found in past developments 
emerging since the issue’s onset. Common wisdom has it that mankind does not learn any 
lessons from history, but without doubt it is constantly influenced by it. 
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However, as historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. pointed out, “the present … re-creates the past. 
This is partly because, once we how things have come out, we tend to rewrite the past in 
terms of historical inevitability.”7 This circular reasoning describes a profound problem 
faced when attempting to understand the present through the observation of history, most 
profoundly so in a case different entities compete to promote history as a legitimating factor. 
This can be clearly observed in issues of disputed territory when, in its simplest form, two 
entities compete for sovereignty over a limited area of land or sea, not necessarily by 
violent means but rather through the attempted establishment of legitimacy to their 
respective claim. Propaganda is then the weapon of choice, and given the prominence 
historic representations and interpretation traditionally take in a propaganda fight between 
parties to a territorial conflict 8 , a clear understanding of historical developments is 
unfortunately not easily achieved. Representations of historic events have to be weighed 
against each other, bearing in mind that the truth may or may not lie somewhere in between 
and might not be found in any traditional narrative. Yet, careful weighing of accounts and 
sources can help attain an idea of developments beyond the question of truth and impact of 
single historic events. 
 
As for the NLL, no person with just a slight knowledge of the issue would contest that its 
origin is to be found towards the end of the Korean war as an open armed conflict, 
originating from a lack of compromise during the phase of negotiations between North 
Korea, its Chinese allies and the United Nations Command (UNC) when sovereignty over 
the coastal islands was determined but no maritime demarcation line agreed upon, and 
brought to geopolitical reality in the aftermath of the 1953 armistice agreement. However, 
understanding of the importance each Korea attaches to the NLL – as much as of the idea of 
a separated Korea itself – requires a look further back into the history of the greater 
Northeast Asian region as a whole.  
 
Ever since its existence Korea had functioned as a punching ball between the powers 
surrounding it.9 However, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the 
                                                 
7 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1971): “The Historian as Participant”, in Daedalus 100, No. 2 (Spring 1971) p350 
8 One rather curious – yet not uncommon – form of propagandizing historical claims to sovereignty over a 
territory is the issuing of postal stamps with related geographical depictions. See Pierce, Todd (1996): 
“Philatelic Propaganda: Stamps in Territorial Disputes”, in IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 4, No. 2 
(Summer 1996) pp62-64 
9 “The Korean people know war. One bit of their lore is that the country has been invaded at least six hundred 
times in the last three millennia….Koreans compare themselves to a school of shrimp caught between two 
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way towards eventual partition was beginning to be laid. Following the end of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth designated the Japanese Meiji Empire, 
amongst other rights on the East Asian mainland, as protector over the Korean peninsula. 
Only five years later, Japan formerly annexed Korea into its empire, which thereupon 
served as Japan’s military stepping stone towards the East Asian continent.10 From there 
Japan was not only to use World War One as a pretext to strengthen it’s presence in 
Manchuria and gain territorial concessions in China, but also used it – together with the 
Manchurian puppet state Manchukuo – as a bridgehead in its eventual invasion of China, in 
what would become the Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s entrance into World War II.11 
 
The Korean population however, bereaved of their freedom and identity, suffered dearly 
under Japanese occupation, circumstances under which anger against the occupying force 
kept fermenting amongst the populace. 12 Thus, different groups of ultimately different 
agenda fanned armed resistance throughout the peninsula, resistance that for some years 
sometimes took the form of open war. Only the increase of Japanese influence in 
Manchuria from1925 on could stop this kind of open warfare, as it took away from these 
groups their base of operations.13 The groups keeping up the fight were doomed to exile, 
with some taking refuge with the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, some 
setting up base in the United States,14 and others opting to head for the Soviet Union or 
engage in guerrilla warfare in the Chinese Northeast, often uniting with Chinese 
Communist forces. 15  As Japan strengthened its war efforts on the Chinese mainland, 
Korean resistance fighters took their fight there, with a large number of them even 
                                                                                                                                                     
whales. Whether the whales are fighting or making love – not to mention feeding – the shrimp have a short 
life expectancy” Millet, Allan R. (2001): “Introduction to the Korean War”, in The Journal of Military 
History 65 (Oct. 2001) pp921-922 
10 Cotterell, Arthur (2002): East Asia. From Chinese Predominance to the Rise of the Pacific Rim. Pimlico, 
London p200 
11 Ibid. pp200-200 
12 Ibid. p200. See also: Schnabel, James F. (1992) [1972]: Policy and Direction. The first year. United States 
Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C. pp3, 4-6 
13 Cotterell, Arthur (2002): East Asia. From Chinese Predominance to the Rise of the Pacific Rim. Pimlico, 
London. pp270-271 
14 Ibid. p270 
15 An account of Mao Zedong's meeting and discussion with Kim Il, Political Commissar of the Korean 
People’s Army transmitted in a telegram to Stalin in May 1949, identifies Kim Il-song as a former guerrilla in 
Manchuria. A translation of the telegram can be found in Kim, Jin Kyung(1996): The evolution of the Korean 
War and the dynamics of Chinese entry. Dissertation, University of Hawaii p190. The same publication, 
though not in said telegram, mentions that Kim Il was a comrade-in-arms of Kim Il-song in Manchuria. Ibid. 
p188. Other evidence on North Korean involvement in the Chinese revolution is found in Chen, Jian (1994): 
China’s road to the Korean War: the making of the Sino-American confrontation. Columbia University Press, 
New York pp106-108 
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integrating into the Chinese Red Army, which would later be known as the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).16 
 
Near the closing of World War II, with the surrender of the Japanese Empire imminent, 
Korea’s plights finally seemed to be coming to an end as well. However, history once more 
held another fate for it in hands, as the peninsula was again to be transferred into a pawn 
between great powers. On the eve of Japanese surrender in August 1945, U.S. President 
Truman saw it necessary to find a solution on how Korea, the only territory in East Asia 
still outside more or less consolidated spheres of influence, could be liberated without 
giving it all up to the Soviet Union. Ever since he had assumed office after Roosevelt’s 
death in 1945, Truman had grown more and more worried about Soviet expansionism in 
Easter Europe. Thus, a solution had to be found which would keep the USSR from taking 
the same road as it had in Europe.17 For the time being however, Truman’s fears seemed to 
be coming true. While the United States were still bogged down on Japan’s islands in the 
Pacific, Soviet troops, right after the decision to intervene against Japan, fought their way 
into Manchuria and towards the Korean peninsula.18 The situation seemed to have been 
decided, when the sudden end of the war – Japan surrendered unconditionally six days after 
the second atomic bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki19 – changed the outset. Suddenly, 
the way to Korea was open to the United States as well.20 As the USSR was continuing its 
march southwards, however, a quick solution had to be found to give the United States time 
to redeploy its troops – the closest ones still stationed on the island of Okinawa.21 Thus 
General Order No. 1 was issued, an order regulating the surrender of Japanese troops. 
                                                 
16 Kim, Jin Kyung(1996): The evolution of the Korean War and the dynamics of Chinese entry. Dissertation, 
University of Hawaii pp42-46, p189 
17 Matray, James I. (1981): “Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel”, in 
Pacific Historical Review 50, No. 2 (May 1981) p150 
18 Soviet troops surpassed their Japanese counterparts both in terms of numbers and heavy equipment, thus 
progressing quickly. Wilson, Ward (2007): “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of 
Hiroshima”, in International Security 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007) p166  
19 After the atomic bombs had exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9 respectively, 
Emperor Hirohito proclaimed Japanese surrender on August 15. The only condition uttered was the 
continuation of the imperial house. Cotterell, Arthur (2002): East Asia. From Chinese Predominance to the 
Rise of the Pacific Rim. Pimlico, London. p245. Some authors dispute this account, crediting the Soviet 
Union’s opening of a second front against Japan rather than the nuclear explosions with eventually persuading 
Japan to surrender.  Wilson, Ward (2007): “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of 
Hiroshima”, in International Security 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007) pp164, 167-175 
20 Matray, James I. (2001): “Revisiting Korea. Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War”, entrance to the Korean 
War Teachers Conference: The Korean War +50 (9 February 2001), on 
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/korean-myths-1.html, 04 December 2011 
21 Schnabel, James F. (1992) [1972]: Policy and Direction. The first year. United States Army Center of 
Military History, Washington D.C. p9 
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Amongst its provisions, General Order No.1 directed the Imperial Army troops in Korea to 
surrender to Soviet troops if north of, and to American troops if south the 38th parallel22 – a 
demarcation chosen, seemingly because of lack of time, rather arbitrarily.23  
 
2.1 The first division - the 1945 partition along the 38th parallel 
Briefly examining the circumstance of the drawing of the partition line is important as it 
resonates until the present in any considerations of today’s partition of the peninsula, 
including the NLL. One would certainly expect that an issue as influential in 20th century 
history as the decision on how Korea should be divided would have been based on careful 
and lengthy analysis of recommendations from a small army of experts on the subject. But 
unfortunately, circumstances at the time did not allow for such processes. Even Dean Rusk, 
later Secretary of State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson but at the time Colonel with 
the Operations Division of the US War Department General Staff, who was personally 
involved in recommending to propose the 38th parallel as partition line, later observed that 
“the choice of the thirty-eighth parallel, recommended by two tired colonels working late at 
night, proved fateful.”24 Rusk and a fellow Colonel, Charles H. Bonesteel25, were tasked – 
under severe time constrictions in the face of Soviet intervention in East Asia – with 
drawing up a scenario for accepting surrender of Japanese troops in the region, with special 
regards to the Korean peninsula, which would ultimately be formulated in General Order 
No. 1. Given that neither of them was an expert on Korean issues, and the absence of 
obvious geographical elements to be used as reference points, they settled for the 38th 
parallel most obvious line of division on their map. This they considered the northernmost 
line possibly acceptable to the USSR, with Seoul and a nearby prisoner-of-war camp 
remaining in US controlled territory.26 As the recommendations of the Colonels Rusk and 
Bonesteel were largely accepted and translated into US foreign policy, the question whether 
                                                 
22 The full text of General Order No.1 can be found in United States Department of State: Diplomatic Papers, 
1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East (=Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 Volume IV) 
Department of State, Washington D.C. pp 658-660 
23 Schnabel, James F. (1992) [1972]: Policy and Direction. The first year. United States Army Center of 
Military History, Washington D.C. pp8-10 
24 Rusk, Dean/Papp, Daniel (Ed.) (1990): As I saw it. Norton, New York p124 
25 Bonesteel would later, after the Korean War, serve as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations unified 
command.  
26 Schnabel, James F. (1992) [1972]: Policy and Direction. The first year. United States Army Center of 
Military History, Washington D.C. pp8-10. See also Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World 
War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York/Houndmills pp37-38 
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a more resourceful consideration of option might have led to a more favourable outcome, 
possibly avoiding or at least minimizing the effects of partition, will remain unanswered. 
 
However, blaming short-sightedness of the American analysis for the ensuing partition 
would do neither the situation nor the persons involved justice, as it would disregard two 
important elements. First, while Europe had for several months already been pacified, 
World War II was still raging in East Asia. With the United States at war, its foreign policy 
was largely dictated by military necessity, often resulting in decisions based on immediate 
military requirements and capabilities rather than long-term diplomatic efforts.27 As George 
M. McCune, then chief of the Korean Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs in State 
Department later somewhat grudgingly noted, “the division … was an arbitrary line, chosen 
by staff officers for military purposes without political or other considerations. The State 
Department … was presented with a fair accompli by the military staffs.”28 It is therefore 
not surprising that two military officers would settle for a line of division logical in the 
absence of alternative geographic features, given the limited commitment of the armed 
forces to Korea, both in terms of strategic interest and ability to provide troops.29 Second, 
while definitely aimed at preventing the communization of the whole peninsula through 
Soviet occupation, the partition of the Korean peninsula was never envisioned as a long-
term institutionalized settlement but rather as a provisional emergency measure to enable 
Japanese surrender, until a medium-term centrally administered trusteeship would be 
established to prepare the peninsula for eventual independence.30 Thus, the decision for the 
38th parallel to function as partition at that time did not seem to effect such long-term 
implications as it eventually would. Expectations most probably were that, should the Red 
Army indeed halt their progress at the 38th, ensuing negotiations would lead to the 
establishment of a unified trusteeship. Should it not intend stop the advance, however, the 
                                                 
27 Ibid. pp38-39 
28 McCune, George M. (1947): “Korea: The First Year of Liberation”, in Pacific Affairs 20, No. 1 (March 
1947) p5 
29 While, as noted, President Truman did presumably see Soviet expansionism as seen in Eastern Europe as a 
threat in East Asia, this does not necessarily translate to the army leadership in the Pacific theatre, which saw 
Japan proper as its main point of strategic interest in the region. Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea 
after World War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York/Houndmills p39 
30 Korean Independence had been identified as the long-term target by the United States, United Kingdom and 
China in the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which was later subscribed to by the USSR. Zonal partition of Korea 
into North and South on the other hand was intended as an emergency measure only, to be “superseded at the 
earliest possible date by a trusteeship for Korea”, a measure initially agreed upon by the USSR and China. 
United States Department of State: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East 
(=Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 Volume IV) Department of State, Washington D.C. pp1093-
1096 
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choice of dividing line would be rendered irrelevant in the first place. The only negative 
choice could therefore be the proposal for a line so unacceptable to Moscow that the Red 
Army would be ordered to advance while it would not have done so had a line further south 
been proposed. From this point of view, Rusk and Bonesteel’s approach to identify a line as 
far north as probably acceptable to the USSR made perfect sense. As Shannon McCune, in 
an 1946 article otherwise highly critical of what she considers an arbitrary drawing of the 
partition line, points out, “a provincial-based line might have made more lasting the baneful 
separation of north and south Korea.”31 
 
Nevertheless, the military approach to drawing the demarcation line cut a deep trench into 
the socio-economic patterns on the peninsula. Partition along 38th parallel cut through more 
than 75 streams, 12 rivers, 181 small cart roads, 104 country roads, 15 all-weather 
provincial roads, 8 better class roads and industrial areas such as the Haeju Bay area, all the 
while running along an elevation profile entirely foreign to traditional Korean approaches 
to setting provincial boundaries.32 While the northern zone was larger in terms of area, the 
southern zone was home to a significant majority of people.33 Of particular importance is 
the notion that even though the total area of cultivated land was larger in the northern zone, 
even then differences in agricultural quality of the arable land pointed to a significant 
advantage in productivity on behalf of the southern zone, leading contemporary 
commentators to speak of the “industrial north and the agricultural south”.34 While the 
division of two such mutually complementing economic areas was probably not anticipated 
to elicit major negative effects in the short run, the ensuing long-term partition of North and 
South Korea increased the importance of this imbalance, which contributes until today to 
North Korea’s food shortage problems. 
 
Partition along the 38th parallel would not only prove fateful for the future of the peninsula 
in general, but also had far-reaching implications for the specific issue of today’s maritime 
delimitation in the Yellow Sea. All of the Northwest Islands, including the northernmost 
Baengnyeongdo, were situated south of the 38th parallel, as were large parts of the Ongjin 
                                                 
31 McCune, Shannon (1946): “Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries”, in The Far Eastern Quarterly 5, No. 3 
(May 1946) p286 
32 Ibid. pp282-283, 286-288 
33  Andrew J. Grajdanzev suggests a relation in populations of 40:60 in north and south respectively. 
Grajdanzev, Andrew J. (1945): “Korea Divided”, in Far Eastern Survey 14, No. 20 (October 1945) pp281-
282 
34 Ibid. pp282-283 
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penininsula, which was however cut off from the rest of the southern zone, causing it to be 
temporarily occupied by Soviet forces. 35 It was also on Ongjin Peninsula that fighting 
broke out at the onset of the Korean War, and as the armistice after the war would leave the 
peninsula under Northern control, while the Northwest islands would be controlled by the 
South, the location chosen for the demarcation line in 1945 still resonates in today’s dispute 
regarding maritime delimitation in the area. 
 
General Order No. 1 was eventually relayed to Stalin for approval, who did not object to 
the partition of Korea into zones (He did however object to the establishment of an 
American zone in Manchuria, around what is today the Chinese port city of Dalian – just as 
the US leadership objected to his request to partition the main islands of Japan).36 As Soviet 
troops really did stop their advance at the 38th parallel37, Korea was separated straight 
through its middle, practically along the same demarcation line that even today still 
separates North and South Korea. Thus the setting for the Korean War was laid. 
 
2.2 A Country Divided 
Treatment of Japanese occupying forces in the areas north and south of the 38th parallel was 
substantially different from each other. While Soviet forces arrested colonial officials and 
dismantled not only the Japanese military but also the colonial police38, the United States 
missed this opportunity of getting to terms with the local population by entrusting control to 
the very same elements which had collaborated with Japan before.39 Voicing of objections 
                                                 
35 Stueck, William Whitney (2002): Rethinking the Korean War: a new diplomatic and strategic history. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton p27 
36 Schnabel, James F. (1992) [1972]: Policy and Direction. The first year. United States Army Center of 
Military History, Washington D.C. p11 
37 Ibid. p16. Lee Jongsoo offers various explanations as to why Stalin agreed to the United States’ proposal of 
the 38th parallel, including his wariness about the United States’ nuclear monopoly, the notion that Korea as a 
buffer in a land war would possibly no longer be relevant given the onset of the nuclear age, the hope for a 
trade-off to eventually lead to a partly Soviet occupation of Japan, the projected inability of the Red Army to 
occupy the whole of the peninsula given it had been rushed into the intervention only days ago, and possible 
consideration of a partition along the 38th as validation of traditional spheres of influence as agreed upon 
earlier between tsarist Russia and Japan. Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World War II. A 
Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York/Houndmills pp43-45 
38 The Soviet occupational forces even allowed for elements of self-government which had come to existence 
after Japanese surrender to continue their functions. Cotterell, Arthur (2002): East Asia. From Chinese 
Predominance to the Rise of the Pacific Rim. Pimlico, London. p271. See also Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The 
Partition of Korea after World War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York/Houndmills pp133-
136. While these and other measures such as beginning land reform helped to elicit support from the 
population, other aspects of Soviet occupation, especially violent atrocities committed by Soviet troops, led to 
widespread resentment among Koreans. Ibid. pp136-137 
39 Ibid. pp45-48 
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was marked as dangerous subversion, as were calls for a quick unification of the country.40 
The plans to turn Korea into a centrally administered trusteeship failed as well.41 Partition 
hardened, and while a formerly provisionally established government under Kim Il-sung 
assumed control of the North, a national council – excluding Korean communist elements – 
under the presidency of the conservative Rhee Syngman was established in the South.42 
While both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to strongly influence political 
developments on the peninsula, different commentators suggest that US policies exerted a 
particularly negative influence on ambitions for unification.43 At the heart of these policies 
lay the belief heeded by parts of the US leadership that negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
such as the trusteeship negotiations, could not possibly lead to an outcome acceptable to the 
United States.44 In September 1947, the US therefore unilaterally brought the issue before 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)45, a move strongly rejected by the USSR 
both because it considered it illegal and conducive to permanent partition and because it 
(correctly) perceived a disadvantage in the balance of political forces in the post-war UN.46 
As an alternative, Stalin called for non-interference and withdrawal of troops from the 
peninsula to leave the issue to Korean self-determination, a move which would have clearly 
favoured the northern regime due to its relative strength at the time. 47  It is therefore 
important to note that while the United States’ policy of promoting a separate election in 
the south was pursued as an anti-communization measure in disregard of widespread 
disagreement from the southern zone’s political landscape and under acceptance of a 
permanent partition, the Soviet Union, though definitely more committed to the trusteeship 
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problem of the Independence of Korea, on http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/19/IMG/NR003819.pdf?OpenElement, 04.12.2011 
46 Gills, B. K. (1996): Korea versus Korea. A case of contested legitimacy. Routledge, London/New York 
pp41-42. See also Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World War II. A Global History. 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York/Houndmills pp124-126 
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approach, equally pursued alternative routes by pushing for sovietisation of the north, 
preparing the ground for ensuring some sort of leftist government for a unified Korea, be it 
through international arbitration or domestic power struggle.48 While US officials suspected 
Soviet support for the trusteeship model as a “ploy to use the trusteeship in order to create a 
united Korea that would fall within Moscow’s sphere of influence”, Soviet officials 
branded any US initiative to promote a coalition government in the south as “a classic 
‘divide and conquer’ strategy” aimed at bringing such a coalition under rightist domination 
at a later stage.49 Arguing strongly for or against either power’s main responsibility in the 
continued partition of the peninsula therefore most probably depends on the observer’s 
ideological predisposition, as a neutral observation will provide one with plenty evidence 
for both. It rather makes sense to view the evolving situation as part of the further-reaching 
beginning antagonisation between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time – the 
accelerated commencement of the Cold War. 
 
Universal elections50 held in the southern zone in May 1948 were accompanied by severe 
violence and fighting – both by left guerrillas and the established right-wing security forces 
– but were nevertheless accepted by the United States and – notwithstanding substantial 
objections by members of the observer mission UNTCOK 51  – the United Nations 52 , 
formally installing Rhee Syngman’s rightist party as government of South Korea.53 On 15 
August 1948 the Republic of Korea was formally established in the south. Not longer than a 
month later, on 9 September, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea followed suit.54 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. pp162-163, 139-140. See also Gills, B. K. (1996): Korea versus Korea. A case of contested legitimacy. 
Routledge, London/New York p43 
49 Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, 
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50 The north Korean administration called southern communist leaders to a conference in Pyongyang and 
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victory. Merrill, John Rosc (1982): Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean 
War. Dissertation, University of Delaware pp145-146 
51 Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York/Houndmills pp123-124 
52 UNGA Resolution 195 declares that a lawful government had been elected (that of the Republic of Korea) 
which effectively controlled “that part of Korea … in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside” 
which was the only government “based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the 
electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the [UNTCOK].” UNGA Resolution 195 (III) (12 
December 1948): The problem of the Independence of Korea, on http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/66/IMG/NR004366.pdf?OpenElement, 04.12.2011 
53 Merrill, John Rosc (1982): Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War. 
Dissertation, University of Delaware p148-156 
54 Lee, Jongsoo (2006): The Partition of Korea after World War II. A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York/Houndmills p124 
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2.3 An imminent war 
Both sides were pushing and planning for reunification on the terms favourable and logical 
to them under their respective self-conception.55 The South was struggling with internal 
rivalries within its security forces, while instigation from the North and left elements in the 
South continued to put the government under pressure.56 The only issues uniting the two 
sides were their demand for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the peninsula and their 
rejection of a permanent partition of the country.57 When the former was realized, Korea 
was left with two governments, facing each other and both claiming to be the sole 
representative of the country.58 Thus numerous clashes and skirmishes evolved at the 38th 
parallel59, an evolution that would keep the conflict simmering, with neither side gaining 
the upper hand, until it would one day eventually lead into open warfare. 
 
2.4 The Korean War 
This day eventually came, when at dawn of 25 June 1950 the North Korean army made a 
decisive push south, overrunning South Korean defence lines and thus the 38th parallel.60 
The attack south advanced rapidly, as South Korean forces had to give way to their Soviet-
equipped Northern counterparts.61 Within days after the attack Truman sent air and naval 
forces to support the South, and redeployed ground troops to Korea. Nevertheless, little 
more than a month had passed when all that was left for the Korean People’s Army to 
assault was a comparatively small area around the port city of Pusan at the southernmost tip 
of the peninsula. This little tip of Korea, however, was what eventually should doom all 
aspirations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to unify the peninsula under their 
flag to failure. Steadfastly held by what remained of South Korean and United States forces 
in Korea, the city of Pusan and the heavily fortified area around it proved impenetrable for 
the North Korean army. By then however, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in 
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absence of the Soviet representative62, had already passed a resolution63 approving and 
establishing a unified command, better known as the UN Command (UNC), under US 
leadership, which was on its way to reinforce the defending forces.64 Supported by air 
strikes on North Korean reinforcement routes, the United States succeeded in landing at 
Pusan, thus drastically changing the numerical ratio of troops at that phase of the war.65 
 
Gradually the UN and South Korean forces gained hold and started to push the North 
Korean troops – exhausted and weakened from weeks of fruitless attacks – northwards. Not 
taking chances however, the UN Commander General Douglas MacArthur planned and 
enacted an unexpectedly but overwhelmingly successful amphibious landing of American 
troops at Inchon, just slightly south of the 38th parallel on the Yellow Sea, thus cutting 
North Korean forces still in the south off from their bases at home. With supply routes cut, 
Northern resistance in South Korea quickly broke down, making way for a northward 
advance of the UN forces. In a matter of months, the momentum of the whole war had 
shifted, this time to the advantage of the South.66 
 
Now it was for South’s forces to on their part cross the 38th parallel. Former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger argues that out of the three choices to either halt the advance at the 
38th parallel and restore the status quo ante, invade the North up to a certain point where 
                                                 
62 On 7 January 1950 Andrey Y. Vishinsky, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, had suggested to Mao 
Zedong that if the People’s Republic of China would repudiate the legal status of the then Representative of 
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Languages Press, Beijing p95 
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While Resolution 82 of 25 June called for the North to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops an for the 
international community to withhold support for the North, Resolution 83 of 27 June recommended UN 
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geographical advantages would allow for a more stable line of defence and retention of a 
negligible but strategically important buffer between US troops and the Chinese67 border 
(Kissinger suggests the narrow neck of the peninsula just north of Pyongyang), and a drive 
for full unification up to the Yalu river, Truman was convinced by UNC Commander 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to opt for the third and probably least 
advantageous.68 At first, however, MacArthur’s plan seemed to progress well. With mainly 
American military support 69  and under American leadership, the South Korean Army 
managed to push back Northern troops, rapidly advancing northward. Occupying the whole 
of Korea seemed within reach as by the end of October, UNC troops had at some points 
almost reached the river Yalu. A month later, however, they were surprised. Since the 
beginning of October the Chinese leadership had made the decision to redeploy troops to 
Korea70 and by mid-October the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) had begun to secretly 
cross the Yalu.71 On November 26 1950, with strength assembled, the attack was launched. 
Yet again the war was about to change its tide.72 
 
Hitting American and UN forces hard and unexpectedly, the Chinese advance won ground 
fast, as it had happened so often in this war. Again the whole momentum was reversed, and 
within little more than a month, the frontline had been pushed back to south of Seoul. 
Beijing could have negotiated for a ceasefire then and there, emerging from the conflict as a 
major victor, as the country that had opposed and defeated the presumably greatest military 
power in the world. A ceasefire near the 38th parallel would also have served Chinese 
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interests in retaining North Korea as a buffer zone between their own border and the South. 
However, the Chinese leadership made the same mistake that every single side of the 
conflict had committed before – it overestimated its advantage of momentum, and blinded 
by the prospect of entirely expelling the United States from Korea, drove on southwards. 73 
 
The United Nations force gradually recovered however, and eventually the Chinese troops 
had to give in to American firepower and halt their advance, finally drawing back to around 
the 38th parallel. What followed was a bloody and costly stalemate of both sides, with 
neither of them taking action decisive enough to gain considerable territory.74 Fighting was 
accompanied by long negotiations in the village of Panmunjom75, which finally lead to an 
armistice agreement, signed between the Commander of the CPV and the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People’s Army on the one hand, and the Commander of the 
UNC (but, notably, not the Republic of Korea) on the other.76 
 
As far as naval aspects are concerned, the Korean War was in some ways quite unusual. 
Geographical properties and location of the peninsula as a stretched peace of land largely 
surrounded by water rendered the use of naval forces as support both in terms of active 
combat support and supply channels an irreplaceable element of warfare. However, 
classical surface to surface engagements only rarely took place. At the outset of the war, 
both North and South Korea commanded functioning naval services, based on training and 
equipment either left behind by Soviet and US occupying forces or later provided by these 
nations to their allied regimes respectively. With around 7,000 men, the ROK Navy was 
somewhat stronger than its Northern counterpart, and was equipped with larger ships than 
the DPRK’s about 45 small craft.77 Northern ships played an important role in facilitating 
the North’s initial drive south by quickly transporting troops southwards. On the other side, 
the ROK Navy ventured to intercept and disturb such transports, most notably in an 
incident east of Pusan where an ROK ship succeeded in sinking a fully loaded North 
Korean troop transport, a decisive action in retaining the ability to land troops in Pusan, the 
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last gate for UN reinforcements.78 Soon however, following President Truman’s order to 
provide naval and air support to the South, the ROK Navy was reinforced by numerous 
American and British naval groups, shifting the balance on the seas decisively. Following a 
one-sided engagement in early July, when UNC ships destroyed the armed escort of a 
North Korean ammunition transport, the North practically abandoned the idea of contesting 
for control of the sea, instead concentrating on supplying the land forces in their advance 
where possible.79 This left the UN navies in definite control of the sea, but as no one could 
be sure of this fact during the first months of engagement, naval troop commitment 
remained high.80 As a result, the UNC retained control of the sea throughout the war, 
enabling naval units to concentrate on intercepting Northern supply transports, providing 
artillery in support of land forces and landing operations such as the decisive landing at 
Inchon.81 
 
While the study of naval engagement during the Korean War might not actually bring 
exhaustive information about the history of inter-Korean naval relations, much less so for 
an analysis not primarily focused on naval history, it should nevertheless not be disregarded 
when attempting to understand today’s dispute on the NLL from a historical perspective. 
The reason for this lies in three distinct insights which the above observations provide. First, 
the notion that both North and South obviously attributed great importance to supporting 
ground forces through naval action is an important element still valid when considering 
today’s policy formulation on both sides. As was the case in 1950, the Korean peninsula is 
still surrounded by water, and any military activity, whatever its scale, would have to rely 
on some kind of naval support. From this point of view, the NLL conflict goes beyond the 
realm of territory disputes focused simply on assertion of sovereignty and legitimacy – 
which can at times resemble more a matter of principle than of practical considerations – by 
reflecting realistic strategic requirements and apprehensions of the two sides. Terence 
Roehrig points to very real security concerns connected with a possible movement of the 
NLL, such as, amongst others, the increased ability of North Korea to rapidly deploy 
Special Forces to the South should the line move any closer to the cities of Inchon and 
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Seoul.82 As during the hot phase of the Korean War, naval warfare today still presents an 
important element in strategic considerations on the Korean peninsula, rendering the NLL, 
with its location close the South’s capital, an especially contentious aspect of such 
considerations. 
 
Second, it is important to note that due to the continuous retention of superiority at sea, it 
was for the UNC to concede territorial waters to the North once the war had cooled off. As 
far as maritime areas are concerned, the UNC therefore had an advantage over its Northern 
counterparts in the truce talks at Panmunjom. The same can of course be said about the 
numerous coastal islands surrounding the peninsula. While in the early days of the war 
there had been – often wrong – reports of Northern forces taking coastal islands83, the 
North’s focus on its troops’ advance on the main body of the peninsula and early cession to 
the UNC of control of the sea does not point to large scale occupation of coastal islands by 
the DPRK. As a result, the Northwest Islands, situated slightly south of the 38th parallel and 
therefore at the outset already in the southern zone, they were at the end of the hot phase as 
much controlled by the UNC as the waters around them.84 This is particularly relevant in 
understanding the particular role the islands played in the armistice agreement and the 
negotiations leading up to it. As will be discussed in the pages to follow, the Northwest 
Islands were singled out as an exceptionally remaining under UNC control in the text of the 
armistice agreement. This only makes sense in conjunction with the notion that due to its 
naval superiority, the UNC could decide which islands to cede to the North’s control, and 
which not. 
 
Third, and closely related to the above considerations, the analysis of naval warfare during 
the war helps to understand North Korea’s ambivalent attitude to the NLL. Throughout the 
first years following the armistice agreement, the North did not contest the NLL and did not 
state its disagreement of the line per se. Only since the early 1970s has the issue evolved to 
a major hot spot in inter-Korean relations.85 As will be shown in the chapters to follow, the 
NLL was originally intended to restrain Southern vessels from entering Northern water, 
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possibly reigniting the war, and the DPRK maintains it was not even informed at the time 
of drawing and never acknowledged the line.86 However, given that during the war the 
North relatively quickly abandoned the idea of naval superiority and rather concentrated its 
entire forces on its campaign on land, control of the coastal waters would probably have 
been of only secondary importance to the DPRK’s considerations. After all, what was at 
stake in the negotiations was to secure a strategically advantageous position on the ground. 
The North’s naval forces had not come close to being match for the UN navy during the 
war, and it would not do so any time soon after it. An advantageous position on the sea 
would thus have been only relative given the lack of ability to defend it, whereas a 
favourable position on land must have been a central security concern. North Korean 
strategy during the Panmunjom negotiations revealed as much when its negotiators 
“maintained UNC withdrawal from islands should not be considered in settlement to be 
made along main battle position.”87 If the DPRK did not have a stake in the Northwest 
Islands area during the war, and considered it strategically less important than control over 
territory on the peninsula itself, it would make sense not to comment on the unilateral 
establishment by the other side of a line originally intended to keep that other side’s vessels 
in reign. Only at a later stage, when economic interests increasingly led to conflicts 
between Northern fishing vessels and the NLL seemed the North’s interest in the line and 
the area revived.88 This does of course not entirely explain why the DPRK did not at the 
time formally protest the unilateral designation by a foreign military entity of a de facto 
demarcation line within its claimed territorial waters. Nevertheless, it might provide a good 
starting point for such considerations. 
 
The Armistice Agreement, signed on 27 July 1953, factually – though not de jure – ended 
the Korean War. Until this day, it is the basis for the separation of the Korean peninsula, 
and largely dictates the circumstances under which the two sides interact. As an armistice 
agreement, military in nature, its main objective was to establish rules and safeguards for 
the ending of hostilities and disengagement of all actors, pending a final peaceful settlement. 
At its heart lay the agreement of a Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which, determined 
                                                 
86 Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary 
Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) p149 
87 United States Department of State: 1951. China and Korea (=Foreign Relations of the United States 1951 
Volume VII) Department of State, Washington D.C. pp1075 
88 Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary 
Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) p149 
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on military grounds, reflected the actual line of contact between the opposing forces at the 
time.89 In addition, it established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which required both sides 
to withdraw their troops to any point at least two kilometres from the MDL. 90  The 
agreement also set out provisions for the distribution of territorial waters surrounding the 
peninsula. While any naval area and coastal islands north and west of the designated 
demarcation line were pronounced to be territorial waters of the North, the five Northwest 
Islands – Baengnyeongdo, Daecheongdo, Socheongdo, Yeonpyeongdo and Udo – were 
explicitly designated under UNC control.91 
 
While the two sides had been able to agree on the status of the coastal islands, negotiations 
failed on the issue of control of the surrounding waters, as the counterparts could not find 
common ground on the breadth of territorial waters in the area.92 In order to prevent naval 
clashes, UNC Commander General Mark W. Clarke on 30 August 1953 unilaterally 
designated a line restricting UN and South Korean ships’ northward movement, thereby 
establishing the NLL.93 As mentioned before, though the DPRK government did pronounce 
its territorial waters to generally extend to a 12 Nautical Mile (NM) boundary repeatedly 
since 1953 94 , it did not contest the NLL per se until 1973, twenty years after its 
establishment.95 From then on, however, the NLL evolved to become an issue of great 
contention between the parties, giving rise to security concerns not only on the peninsula 
and Northeast Asia, but in the international community at large. 
 
A thorough analysis of the NLL from different angles is not possible without understanding 
its historical origins. As discussed, due consideration has to be given to the fact that 
                                                 
89 United Nations Security Council: “Letter dated 7 August 1953 from the acting United States Representative 
to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, Transmitting a Special Report of the Unified 
Command on the Armistice in Korea in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950 
(S/1588)”, UN Document S/3097 p11 
90 Ibid. p11. Provisions for the establishment of the DMZ are prescribed in Art. I of the Armistice Agreement. 
“Agreement between the Commander-in.Chief, United Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander of 
the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Concerning a Military 
Armistice in Korea. Signed at Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953”, in International Organization 7, No. 4 
(November 1953) pp612-614 
91 Armistice Agreement Art. II Paragraph 13b). Ibid. pp614-615 
92 Morita, Keiko (2004): “Northern Limit Line: Demarcation Issues in the Yellow Sea”, in National Institute 
for Defense Studies Security Reports No. 5 (March 2004) p30 
93 Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary 
Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) p149 
94 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 198) p3 
95 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in 
Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p521 
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different points of view and interpretations exist. However, six decades of accumulated 
deliberations on the Korean War, its origins and consequences, have allowed today’s 
observer to identify a comparatively clear, or rather balanced, picture of the events leading 
to the eventual establishment of the NLL. However, the insights gained from a historical 
analysis go well beyond simply chronicling the origins of the NLL. It also helps to lift the 
fog on several questions which still define the quest for a solution to the conflict today: 
How come two nations with common culture, language and historical heritage regularly 
find themselves on the brink of war over a maritime border in an area where the control 
over the adjacent landmasses is practically uncontested? Why does the 1953 Armistice 
Agreement not present a viable solution for the conflict? How come the NLL evolved into a 
long-term political question instead of an easily negotiated technical issue?  
 
At the same time however, a historical analysis presents a new set of questions. As 
discussed, the question why North Korea waited for twenty years to formally challenge the 
validity of the NLL, though partly explored, remains open. What are the positions of the 
actors involved today, and what role do international actors with a historical part in the 
conflict assume today? To what extent do economic interests influence actors’ perspectives 
and decisions? Does the NLL, having seen its historical perspective, have a realistic future 
as the border delimiting North and South Korea? While the historical analysis shows that 
these and other questions are central to the dispute on the NLL, it cannot provide answers 
to them in a comprehensive manner. Other means of analysis are therefore required. 
 
However the historical analysis offers valuable insights beyond the origins of the NLL. The 
probably most salient factor in the history of inter-Korean relations at large is clearly the 
constant influence of foreign powers on the peninsula’s fate. The ancient allegory of Korea 
as a shrimp caught between to whales, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, has 
seemingly not lost any of its validity. Throughout the 20th century, Korean affairs have 
largely been dictated by international actors. And the whales are not getting less. In today’s 
global community, and with growing stakes on the peninsula, more actors see their interests 
concerned than ever. The question is, given the developments, such as increased 
institutionalization and economic integration, which transformed the international 
community in the post-Cold War era, whether or not the implications of international 
involvement have transformed as well. As the historical analysis has shown, foreign 
powers’ involvement, whether it influenced the situation for the better or for worse, tended 
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to serve these powers national interests more than anything else. The question whether this 
is still valid for the 21st century, or whether alternative approaches to interaction will 
prevail, and how the two Koreas view the world and their situation, can only be explored by 
analysing the theoretical dimension of the NLL dispute and the situation on the peninsula as 
a whole.  
 
 
3. A theoretical approach 
Having gained insights into the historical developments in last century East Asia, on the 
Korean peninsula and with a view to the NLL in particular, a major question must be 
whether upcoming developments can be predicted just as past ones were examined in the 
preceding chapter. The answer must of course be, clear and simple, no, given that the tools 
of historical analysis – accounts of events and facts – is not at hand when it comes to 
predicting and analysing future developments. While a historical analysis can reveal certain 
patterns which allow for deliberations on future developments, and also, as an important 
point, lays bare the setting which present and future leaders and governments tend to base 
their decisions on, only the classification of past events and present constellations within a 
comprehensive theoretical framework enables the analyst to focus the accumulated 
information and draw from it certain conclusions on future behaviour of actors. As Stephen 
M. Walt put it, “Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists … but 
there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real word of policy. 
Even policymakers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often 
unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do”.96 
 
Pursuing this argument, one should equally not forget the possible normative character of 
international relations theory – as The Oxford Handbook of International Relations notes, 
“all theories of international relations and global politics have important empirical and 
                                                 
96 Walt, Stephen M. (1998): “International Relations: One World, Many Theories” in Foreign Policy No. 110, 
Special Edition (Spring 1998), p 29 
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normative dimensions”97 – which makes it useful beyond the mere scientific analysis of 
events, as practical instructions for political action.98  
 
These aspects of international relations theory shed light on a number of questions with 
regards to the issue at hand. Given the variety of schools of thought and approaches to the 
field, which theoretical approach is best suited to describe and analyse the current 
constellation on the Korean peninsula? Does the same approach apply to an analysis of the 
NLL dispute? To what extent can its application provide any indication of future 
developments? Which approach describes best the world view of the actors involved, and to 
what extent does it influence their behaviour? 
 
These questions can provide important insights in the analysis of the situation surrounding 
the NLL, and the constellation of actors involved. To gain these insights in their full scope, 
however, and to take into account the historical and present international dimension of the 
conflict, the NLL as well as the theoretical framework for the dispute have to be viewed 
within the wider scope of interest of the actors involved, not only encompassing the Korean 
peninsula, but also the theoretical debate on East Asia in general.99 
 
3.1 Setting the Wider Stage – The East Asian Security Framework 
Modern East Asia has, as far as international relations scholars are concerned, long been a 
battleground between the traditional great schools of thoughts. While on the one hand Neo-
realists perceive Asia as an area characterized by a balance of power between the states 
achieved through deterrence, balancing and alliances, with a worried look at China’s 
economic and military rise as a catalyst for heightened tensions and conflict, on the other 
hand scholars adhering to liberalist thought see the integration in international institutions 
and economic interdependence among Asian States as factors substantially mitigating the 
                                                 
97 Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan (2008): “Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourse of 
International Relations”, in Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 6 – Emphasis in the original 
98 Spindler, Manuela/Schieder, Sigfried (2010): “Theorien in der Lehre von den internationalen Beziehungen”, 
in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen. Verlag Barbara 
Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills, pp 26f 
99 Kim, Ki-Jung (2005): “Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula”, in Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 
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likelihood of conflict on the continent.100 Both approaches merit a closer analysis, and both 
sides have a point in referring to historic and present developments in the wider region. 
 
3.2 A Neo-realist Approach 
Neorealism is, as its name suggests, rooted in the school of thought of classical realism. 
Classical realism, developed from the rubbles of the political idealism and historical 
optimism of the 1930s, shattered by the catastrophe of World War II101, sees its origins in 
the writings of Greek historian Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli’s Il Principe, and is most 
often connected to Thomas Hobbe’s characterization of man as a wolf to man. It portrays 
this very pessimistic image of human nature on nations in the theatre of international 
politics, which are therefore on their turn, like man itself, engaged in an eternal struggle for 
power, a concept which is viewed as a universal principle unalterable as man’s and nations’ 
ultimate objective. 102 In an international environment characterized by anarchy and the 
absence of a regulating element, the occurrence of conflict and war is considered not only 
very likely, but unavoidable among certain constellation of states.103 States act in pursuit of 
their own interest – which is, in its most basic form, often equated with survival – and with 
their interest as their only goal, and international cooperation is viewed, if at all, as a by-
product of that striving for one’s own interests. These interests are however, according to 
political realists, always to be understood as constituted by the concept of power.104 As 
                                                 
100 This constellation, or some elements of it, is examined or reflected in a number of scholarly examinations, 
including: Glaser, Charles (2011): “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean 
Pessimism”, in Foreign Affairs 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011) p81; Kang, David C. (2003): “Getting Asia 
Wrong. The Need for New Analytical Frameworks”, in International Security 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003) pp58, 
61-66; Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated 
Settlement”, in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) pp510-511, 530; Ross, Robert S. (1999): “The 
Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century”, in International Security 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999) 
p8; Mansourov, Alexandre Y. (2005): “Northeast Asian Vortex: Regional Change, Global Implications”, in 
Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005) p532; Kim, Ki-Jung (2005): “Establishing Peace on the Korean 
Peninsula”, in Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005) pp491-492 
101  Siedschlag, Alexander (1997): Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und postinternationale Politik. Beispiel 
internationale Sicherheit – Theoretische Bestandsaufnahme und Evaluation. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 
p44 See also Jacobs, Andreas (2010): “Realismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien 
der Internationalen Beziehungen. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills pp47f, 50 
102  Siedschlag, Alexander (1997): Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und postinternationale Politik. Beispiel 
internationale Sicherheit – Theoretische Bestandsaufnahme und Evaluation. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 
pp49, 50-54 
103 Oye, Kenneth A. (1985): “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies” in World 
Politics 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp1, 6-7 
104 “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses 
rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics 
possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates the astounding 
continuity in foreign policy which makes … foreign policy … by and large consistent within itself, regardless 
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power is utilized to attain one’s interests, which are themselves constituted by power, the 
concept of power tends to take a universal place as means and ends in classical realism, 
leaving no room for universal moral principles as basis for the assessment of a nation’s 
behaviour. 105  These radical aspects of realist political thought – its radical view and 
overemphasis of human nature and the universality of its concept of power – were 
consequently employed by its critics to call for the development of a theory more 
applicable to actual international politics including international political processes, as 
compared to political realism as a theory based solely on nationally formulated foreign 
policy.106  
 
Neorealism views the world in many ways similarly to its theoretical ancestor, as an 
environment characterized by anarchy and the absence of a sovereign institution providing 
norms and rules for relations between states.107 It also considers man’s nature in very much 
the same pessimistic way as does classical realism.108 Nevertheless, these aspects central to 
classical realism and neorealism alike also constitute main differences between the two. As 
opposed to classical realism, the neorealist paradigm 109  sees the international system, 
though in anarchic state, as a structural phenomenon which allows for regularities in a 
state’s behaviour and behaviour independent from the nation’s interest as formulated in 
classical realism. The system still being anarchic without a central sovereign regulating 
element, the structure is defined by mutual relations between individual states.110 On the 
other hand, man’s nature, while viewed equally pessimistic by classical realists and 
neorealists, is not considered to be the major explanation for international relations in 
neorealist thought. As Kenneth N. Waltz, probably the most prominent exponent of 
neorealism put it, “While human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war, it 
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105 Ibid. pp 49f 
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cannot by itself explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that man’s 
nature is such that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not.”111 
Waltz’s take on neorealism, also known as structural realism112, plays an important role in 
today’s discourse between realist and liberal scholars in the study of conflict and 
cooperation through its emphasis on the concept of security as opposed to classical 
realism’s concept of power as the central motif of state’s mutual relations. While Waltz 
retains power as an important aspect of a nation’s behaviour, he denies its quality as the 
ultimate goal of these acts. Instead, he defines security as the main measurable element in 
nations’ struggle for survival in an anarchic system, with power as a means to attain the 
goal of security.113 
 
As a consequence of his emphasis of security as the ultimate goal of all states, Waltz, in the 
formulation of the components of his structural approach – ordering principle, qualities and 
capabilities – neglects the specific nature of individual states. In the anarchic system of 
international relations, all states struggle for security to ensure survival 114 , therefore 
mitigating other aspects of their nature (which constitute the component of qualities).115 
This results in the irrelevance of major specific characteristics of nations, such as their form 
of government, in neorealists’ understanding of the international system. Neorealists thus 
consider all states, while possibly pursuing other various interests (which are consequently 
considered irrelevant), to have survival as their main objective. In pursuing this goal 
neorealists view states as acting rationally as defined by acting based on a sound relation of 
means and ends in deciding how to act, a behaviour that is influenced only by the insecurity 
                                                 
111 Waltz, Kenneth N. (2001) [1959]: Man, the State and War. A theoretical Analysis. Columbia University 
Press, New York p29. According to Waltz, this conclusion has far-reaching consequences: “If human nature is 
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Mearsheimer, John J. (2009): “Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations 23, No. 2 (June 2009) 
p242. See also Schörnig, Niklas (2010): “Neorealismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): 
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regarding the intentions and behaviour of other states.116 As for Waltz’s other components 
of the structural international system, the ordering principle describes the structure of the 
international system, which in neorealist school of thought is necessarily anarchic, while 
the component of capabilities refers to the relative abilities and the resulting relative power 
of states, which again shows the importance of power as means rather than an end in 
neorealist theory117, and serves as means to distinguish states from each other through their 
capability to project power.118 These capabilities play a critical role when it comes to states 
balancing against potential aggressors. Facing a potential rival’s ambitions to increase its 
share of power, a state is expected to rebalance – either internally, through the 
strengthening of capabilities, or externally, through joining in a coalition with other 
states. 119  Waltz contrasts the concept of balancing with the concept of bandwagoning, 
which he views as impractical given the anarchic state of the international system120. As 
bandwagoning would automatically endanger the security of the bandwagoning state, Waltz 
concludes that “balancing, not bandwagoning is the behaviour induced by the system”121 
                                                 
116  While in 1994, John Mearsheimer named the state thinking strategically about survival and acting 
“instrumentally rational” as one of the “realism’s five assumptions”, he rejected the idea of states necessarily 
acting rationally as a given principle of realist thought (of both realism in general and Waltz’s structural 
realism in particular) in 2009. See Mearsheimer, John J. (1994): “The False Promise of International 
Institutions” in International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p10 and Mearsheimer, John J. (2009): 
“Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations 23, No. 2 (June 2009) pp241-242. See also 
Schörnig, Niklas (2010): “Neorealismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien der 
Internationalen Beziehungen. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills p72 
117 As oposed to security, which is the highest end. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. 
Random House, Berkeley p126 
118 Schörnig, Niklas (2010): “Neorealismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien der 
Internationalen Beziehungen. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills p72 
119 Mearsheimer, John J. (2009): “Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations 23, No. 2 (June 
2009) p243 
120 Mearsheimer formulates that “bandwagoning is where a threatened state joins forces with the threatening 
state to exploit other states, but allows its dangerous rival to gain a disproportionate share of the spoils that 
they conquer together.” Ibid. p234 
121 He provides an example of how the anarchic system and state’s pursuit of security promote balancing: 
“The goal the system encourages [states] to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end. 
Given two coalitions, for example, the greater success of one in drawing members to it may tempt the other to 
risk preventive war, hoping for victory through surprise before disparities widen. If states wished to maximize 
power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony 
forged. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced by the system- 
The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.” Waltz, 
Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. Random House, Berkeley p126. Siedschlag sees Waltz’s 
concept of the balance of power, described as a “top-down-process” induced by the system, as a critique of 
classical realism’s assumption of a moral principle forming rational foreign policy as the cause for the 
balance-of-power phenomenon. Siedschlag, Alexander (1997): Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und 
postinternationale Politik. Beispiel internationale Sicherheit – Theoretische Bestandsaufnahme und 
Evaluation. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen pp 96f. Stephen Walt suggests that states’ choices whether to 
engage in balancing or bandwagoning depend on a variety of issues, including ideological factors, the 
available options for alliances17 and the dominant tendency in the international system at the time. 
Nevertheless he agrees with Waltz in concluding that “states form alliances to balance against threats rather 
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One important fragmentation within the neo-realist spectrum is the divide between 
offensive and defensive realists. This rift, occurring in the aftermath of Waltz’s original 
deliberations on structural realism, evolved around the question whether states necessarily 
strive for power without restrictions or whether they may settle for a situation where both 
themselves and their rivals keep a level of security just high enough to guarantee for each 
side’s security and sovereignty. 122  While offensive realists, visibly leaning towards 
classical realism’s presumption of power as the ultimate and universal factor (albeit 
bypassing the latter’s assumption of human nature as the reason for the pursuit of power)123, 
contend that major powers do  not seek (or could not possibly attain) mutual security and 
therefore see an increase in their own relative power as the only way to attain security for 
themselves, defensive realists tend to argue that states would in many, indeed in most cases 
be willing to settle for mutual security, but are usually prevented to exploit this pattern by 
the uncertainty of their rival’s intentions. As Robert Jervis aptly puts it, “often states would 
be willing to settle for the status quo and are driven more by fear than by the desire to make 
gains.”124 
 
Assuming that more cooperation between nations is possible than the anarchic state of the 
international system would suggest, defensive realist thought shares remarkable elements 
with the other school of thought traditionally involved in the debate on East Asia – the 
liberal approach to international relations in the region. Granted the liberal thought in 
international relations covers a wide array of theories and approaches, liberal 
institutionalism, with its history as a counterweight to (neo)-realism in debates on security 
and cooperation, seems well fit as the representative element for liberal thought in this 
study. 
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122 Schörnig, Niklas (2010): “Neorealismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien der 
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3.3 On the Necessity of Conflict – A Liberal Institutionalist Approach 
As a basis liberal institutionalists assume, much like their realist and neorealist counterparts, 
the world to be in anarchy by principle.125 They also do not dispute the fact that power, or 
the distribution of capabilities126, play an important role in international relations. However, 
as the name tells, international institutions are much more central to their approach than 
they are to realism. Needless to say, the question does not revolve around whether or not 
international institutions exist, and not even whether or not institutions are found where 
cooperation is high.127 Instead, in essence, while realist thinkers concede that institutions 
are a mere tool of statecraft to be employed when it serves the interest of a state in its 
anarchic environment, liberal institutionalists assume that an institution itself can influence 
the behaviour of states – and increase cooperation – be it through the assumption that 
states’ behaviour is, besides its self-interest, equally based on the “anticipated  positive 
effects of long term international cooperation”128, or the assumption that even a state’s 
central self-interests would sooner or later lead it to develop an interest in the functional 
advantages of international institutionalisation.129 As Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and 
Timothy Nordstrom put it, “liberal institutional theory argues that [intergovernmental 
organizations] foster non-violent conflict resolution and constrain the advent of disputes. … 
Realists, by contrast, have long argued that [intergovernmental organizations] reflect, rather 
than effect, world politics.” 130  Following the logic of the “Kantian tripod” 131 , liberal 
institutionalists, in attaching central importance to international institutions’ ability to 
                                                 
125 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane are careful not to exclude the posible existence of a fragmented 
international society, embodied by continuing internatioal relationships that engender stable expectations 
about behaviour. Nevertheless, they clearly state that “anarchy, defined as lack of common government [in 
world politics], remains a constant.” Axelrod, Robert/Keohane, Robert O. (1985): “Achieving Cooperation 
under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” in World Politics 38, No. 1 (Oct. 1985), p226. Kenneth A. Oye 
equally stresses the anarchic nature of the international system, while at the same time suggesting that the 
same system allows for different outcomes. Oye, Kenneth A. (1985): “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Hypotheses and Strategies” in World Politics 38, No. 1 (October 1985) p1 
126  Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (1995): “The Promise of Institutional Theory” in International 
Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995) p47 
127  Jervis, Robert (1999): “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate” in 
International Security 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999) p53-54 
128  Siedschlag, Alexander (1997): Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und postinternationale Politik. Beispiel 
internationale Sicherheit – Theoretische Bestandsaufnahme und Evaluation. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 
p 62 (translated from German) 
129 Ibid. p163 
130  Boehmer, Charles/Gratzke, Erik/Nordstrom, Timothy (2004): “Do Intergovernmental Organizations 
Promote Peace?”, in World Politics 57, No. 1 (October 2004) p1 
131 Democracy, cross-border trade and international organizations, which are widely held to be conducive to a 
peaceful international environment.  
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influence state behaviour, consider such institutions to promote peace and decrease violent 
confrontation in international relations. 
 
However, despite liberal institutionalism’s focus on international institutions, the realist-
liberal dispute goes beyond the role of these, as it equally revolves around the direct 
cooperation between states itself. 132  With regards to this further-reaching dimension, 
common perception often points to a constellation where realists deny the possibility of 
international cooperation or at least see it hardly ever realized, whereas liberal scholars see 
a world full of opportunities for cooperation (mainly facilitated through international 
institutions). Contrary to this perception, or better put refining it, Robert Jervis made a 
strong case to view the realist-liberal disagreement on cooperation not as a question of 
whether cooperation exists in the world or its extent, but rather of “how much conflict in 
world politics is unnecessary or avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree even 
though their preferences overlap.”133 Following this logic, he suggests that while realists 
think that cooperation between states has already gone so far that no decision could lead to 
mutual – or absolute – gains, liberal institutionalists see a lot of opportunities for 
cooperation – which are most often not realized due to mistrust and uncertainty among 
states134. Jervis further asserts that liberal analysis is not necessarily applicable to situations 
where distributional issues are to be understood 135 , echoing a traditional neorealist 
argument accusing international liberalism to exclusively focus on situations with possible 
absolute gains while ignoring issues where states face each other over relative gains – 
rendering it rather useless for understanding actual processes in international relations.136 
This goes hand in hand with the allegation that liberal institutionalists tend to see 
international relations as two separate dimensions – security and military issues on the one 
hand, and political economy on the other,137 with military-security issues displaying “more 
                                                 
132 Even though these dimensions are of course closely intertwined. 
133  Jervis, Robert (1999): “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate” in 
International Security 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), p 47 – Emphasis in the original 
134  Mistrust which, Jervis goes on to argue, liberal institutionalists think could be alleviated by the 
employment of international institutions. Ibid. p 47f 
135 Ibid. p 48 
136 Mearsheimer, John J. (1994): “The False Promise of International Institutions” in International Security 19, 
No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp 19-21 
137 The argument is actually rooted in early liberal writings. Charles Lipson asserts that “significantly different 
institutional arrangements [are] associated with international economic and security issues.” Lipson, Charles 
(1984): “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs” in World Politics 37, No. 1 (Oct. 1984) 
p 12. Axelrod and Keohane pick up the very same argument in Axelrod, Robert/Keohane, Robert O. (1985): 
“Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” in World Politics 38, No. 1 (Oct. 1985), 
p 226f 
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of the characteristics of anarchy than … political economic ones”138, and liberal theory 
mainly, if not exclusively, applying to the latter.139 However, while liberal institutionalists 
do stress the differences in security-related and political-economic issues, they reject the 
idea of a theory only applicable to one of them. 140  Equally, while they assert that 
institutions will not be significant when two states show perfectly conflicting interests141, 
and that distributional gains (which are an issue when conflicting interests meet) are under 
certain circumstances not necessarily as important as claimed to be142, Robert O. Keohane 
and Lisa L. Martin plead for a view of institutions, and thus institutional theory, as far more 
important in understanding distributional issues than realists suggest.143  
 
As a result of these diametrically opposed postulates, neorealism and liberal 
institutionalism are, notwithstanding some of their protagonists sometimes harsh criticism 
of each other’s school of thoughts144, in many ways, especially when it comes the study of 
cooperation among nations, more closely related to each other than their equally opposed 
eventual findings on the influence of institutions on the causes for state behaviour would 
suggest. As Keohane and Martin put it at another point, “As we have emphasized, there is 
                                                 
138 Ibid. p 226f. However, after the end of the Cold War Waltz himself contended that “conflict grows all the 
more easily out of economic competition because economic comparisons are easier to make than military 
ones.”  Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993): “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, in International 
Security 18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993) p66 
139 Mearsheimer, John J. (1994): “The False Promise of International Institutions” in International Security 19, 
No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p 15 
140  Axelrod, Robert/Keohane, Robert O. (1985): “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions” in World Politics 38, No. 1 (Oct. 1985), p 227 and Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (1995): 
“The Promise of Institutional Theory” in International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p 44 
141  Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (1995): “The Promise of Institutional Theory” in International 
Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p44 
142 Snidal, Duncan (1991): “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”, in The American 
Political Science Review 85, No. 3 (September 1991) pp701, 702, 722. See also Rousseau, David L. (1999): 
“Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International Politics”, Unpublished Manuscript, 
University of Pennsylvania, on http://www.albany.edu/~dr967231/papers/absrel5.pdf, 04.12.2011 p3 
143 They argue that international institutions help in ameliorating states’ reluctance to cooperate in situations 
of uncertain outcome through providing both a coordination mechanism for the disclosure and clarification of 
preferences and a framework for disclosure of information on distributions of gains and settlement of related 
disputes. Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (1995): “The Promise of Institutional Theory” in International 
Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp44-45 
144 A good example being Mearsheimer’s criticism of institutionalism per se and Keohane and Martin’s 
subsequent response, which fundamentally criticises realist scholars’ approach to international relations and 
science. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994): “The False Promise of International Institutions” in International 
Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp 5-49 and Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (1995): “The Promise 
of Institutional Theory” in International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp 39-51 
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much in common between realism and institutional theory, particularly in its early years. … 
for better or worse, institutional theory is a half-sibling of realism.”145  
 
In this sense, it is not surprising that a major aspect in understanding the theoretical 
constellation on the Korean peninsula joins two assumptions each rooted in one of the two 
approaches respectively. The so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma, originating in liberal view of 
international relations 146 , and the Security Dilemma, which reflects an important 
assumption in realist thought147, are crucial in formulating a theoretical analysis of inter-
Korean relations, as will be shown in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
3.4 The Security Dilemma as an Aspect of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Examining liberal institutionalists’ contention that conflict is often unnecessary, one has to 
face the question why states nevertheless tend to engage in it, even as their interests might 
be congruent to a certain extent. Leaving aside the already examined dispute over 
institutional theories ability to grasp distributional issues as a source of conflict, liberal 
institutionalists tend to utilize a game-theory approach to show states’ behaviour when 
facing one another. This again leads them to conclude a major assumption in liberal 
institutionalism, that being that states, out of fear of being cheated or even simple 
misinformation, will act rationally in defecting from possible cooperation with a 
counterpart rather than exploiting the mutual benefits which could be gained – the 
international relations version of a classical prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is 
most often introduced as a situation of two criminals in police custody and the choices they 
face. Jack Donnelly describes “two rational actors, each of whom has available two 
strategies on of which is fundamentally cooperative (“cooperate”) and the other of which is 
essentially competitive (“defect”). … Two thieves are apprehended by the police and taken 
in, separately, for questioning. Each is offered a favourable plea bargain in return for a 
confession and testimony against the other. But without a confession the authorities can 
obtain a conviction only on a lesser charge. … Giving in to temptation – defecting 
                                                 
145 Keohane, Robert O./Martin, Lisa L. (2003): “Institutional Theory as a Research Program”, in Elman, 
Colin/Elman, Miriam Fendius (Ed.): Progress in International Relations Theory. Appraising the Field. MIT 
Press, Camebridge/London, pp 80f 
 
146  Jervis, Robert (1999): “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate” in 
International Security 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), p47 
147 Herz, John H. (1950): “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, in World Politics 2, No. 2 
(January 1950) pp157-158 
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(confessing), while one’s partner cooperates (remains silent) … provides the greatest gains. 
But above all else the players … want to avoid … sitting in prison, for a long time, due to 
the treachery of one’s “partner” … If they cooperate, each gets their second best 
outcome… . But cooperating risks getting suckered. Therefore … each will choose to 
defect even though both know that they both could be better of by cooperating.”148 While 
therefore defection is the rational option for both participants if the game is played only 
once (as it is then the only way of making sure to avoid being cheated, which is the least 
desirable outcome), the key to its further-reaching analysis is its continuous repetition, 
which allows for different rational choices depending on the respective counterpart’s range 
of choices.149 
 
Robert Jervis contends that the prisoner’s dilemma is a liberal concept, however one which 
defensive realists such as himself would accept as an important element in international 
relations.150 It is therefore not surprising that he should be the author of a most extensive 
analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma’s effects on states’ behaviour, and equally of states’ 
behaviour on the dilemma.151 In it, he not only describes the “Stag Hunt”152 as a parallel 
model to the prisoner’s dilemma, but even more centrally shows the relation of a 
                                                 
148 Donnelly, Jack (2000): Realism and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
pp19-20 – Emphasis in the original. A concise scientific discussion of the shortcomings of the traditional 
approach to the security dilemma, especially its restriction to two extreme choices (cooperate or defect), can 
be found in To, Theodore (1988): “More Realism in the Prisoner’s Dilemma” in Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 32, No. 2 (June 1988), pp402-408 Indeed, criticism of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model ranges from 
its assumption of an artificially sterile environment (which some conclude is not so far from the reality of the 
international environment states face) to the oversimplification of actors and its failure to acknowledge 
cognitive elements of strategic interventions and concomitant effects of interaction such as give-and-take 
dynamics. Nevertheless, while “such models cannot adequately describe the actual play of experimental 
subjects, much less the play of actors as complex as states, … gaming models … are useful, despite their 
limitations, for the analytic exposition of bargaining relationships. They can be used to explore (1) the pattern 
of structural constraints on players’ choices; (2) the varied inducements and punishments they represent; (3) 
the role of environmental variables, including time horizons, in modifying the players’ interactions; and (4) 
the relationship between the choice of each and the outcome for all.” Lipson, Charles (1984): “International 
Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs”, in World Politics 37, No. 1 (Oct. 1984) pp3-4, 10-9 
149 Jervis, Robert (1978): “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” in World Politics 30, No. 2 (January 
1978), p171 
150 Ibid. pp 47, 49 
151 The latter especially in terms of the offence-defence ratio in states’ military build-up. Ibid. pp199-210 
152 The Stag Hunt refers to a scenario different from the prisoner’s dilemma’s: A group of men are hunting a 
stag, in which they can only succeed if each group member cooperates. If one person defects to chase a rabbit 
– which he could catch alone but likes less than stag – instead, the other persons will not get anything. 
Therefore, while all actor’s first rational preference is to cooperate and catch a stag, an actor can, for whatever 
reason, pursue their second preference, chasing a rabbit, making him the only one to catch food. The third 
preference would be for all actors to go chasing the rabbit, making it harder to catch, while the last preference 
would no doubt be for one to continue hunting the stag while others chase the rabbit. Jervis suggests the same 
is true for states, who are influenced by the anarchic system to pursue their second preference of defecting, 
even if their first rational choice would be to cooperate. Ibid. p 167 
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traditionally realist concept, the security dilemma – which is characterized through the 
assumption that “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease 
the security of others”153 – to the liberal prisoner’s dilemma. In doing so, he provides an 
important insight into the development process of a security dilemma between two states.  
 
Realist scholar John H. Herz in 1950 described the security dilemma as an inevitable 
phenomenon arising from the anarchic nature of the system of international relations: 
“Wherever such anarchic society has existed – and it has existed in most periods of known 
history on some level – there has arisen what may be called the “security dilemma” of men, 
or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and 
usually are, concerned about their security from being attached, subjected, dominated, or 
annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, 
they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power 
of others. This, in turn, renders the other more insecure and compels them to prepare for the 
worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power 
competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”154 
Jervis proposes that the security dilemma stems from a constellation present in the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma, stating that “the fear of being exploited (that is, the cost of CD) most 
strongly drives the security dilemma.”155 CD in this case refers to the constellation where 
one state cooperates while the other one defects, which is, as has been shown, the outcome 
deemed the most undesirable by far. As states engaging in interactions with others have to 
assume that they might be cheated by their counterpart at any time, they naturally see the 
need to increase their own security, therefore decreasing the costs of a possible defecting 
counterpart. Jervis argues that while large and powerful states can afford to be more relaxed 
when interacting with others, while small countries will find themselves threatened more 
                                                 
153 Ibid. p169. Charles L. Glaser deems this definition as incomplete, as it does not explain why the security 
dilemma would be a problem. As he puts it, “if states value their own security but not the security of others, 
why would an action that makes one’s adversary less secure necessarily be bad? The most obvious reason is 
that the adversary is likely to react to having its security reduced. And by the same logic the adversary’s 
reaction will in turn reduce the state’s security. But why does not this action-reaction process simply leave the 
state’s security unchanged … ?” As a consequence, he identifies three ways  in which the security dilemma, 
expressed as an attempt to reduce an adversary’s security, reduces a state’s own security: (1) initiation of a 
process which reduces the state’s ability to perfom military operations; (2) the adversary might increase the 
value it places on expansion as a means to secure its security; and (3) waste of money. Glaser, Charles L. 
(1997): “The Security Dilema Revisited”, in World Politics 50, No. 1 (October 1997) pp174-175  
154 Herz, John H. (1950): “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, in World Politics 2, No. 2 
(January 1950) p157 
155 Jervis, Robert (1978): “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” in World Politics 30, No. 2 (January 
1978), p172 
  - 37 - 
easily. The higher the cost of the CD constellation, the more will the interaction be 
influenced by the security dilemma.156 Equally, the security dilemma is stronger when a 
state sees itself threatened by many enemies, while it only sees few allies.157 The security 
dilemma can be ameliorated through decreasing the perceived likelihood of defection 
(though the conviction that one has no choice but to cooperate provides another state with 
the opportunity to threaten to defect unless provided with benefits), either through 
reassurances or external mechanisms such as inspection devices.158 Another factor Jervis 
deems important in determining the strength of the security dilemma is the offence-defence 
balance in a state’s capabilities.159 As mentioned above, Charles L. Glaser attempted to 
strengthen and refine Jervis’ description of the security dilemma, especially in clarifying 
why a spiral of security increases, set in motion by one state’s attempt in strengthening its 
own, would be undesirable instead of, simply speaking, meaningless as it would eventually 
leave the security balance between both states untouched. 160  Glaser also provides an 
examination as to whether the security dilemma is simply driven by misperceptions, or 
rather based on rational actions taken by the states involved. He argues that both is possible, 
but while the dilemma is usually based on a rational foundation, misperceptions cause it to 
be more severe than otherwise necessary. His argument is based that even in structural 
theory, which usually builds on the idea that state action is induced by the structure of 
system (instead of being based on knowledge about the – unobservable – motives of others), 
a state can observe from the outcomes of others’ actions information about their intentions. 
This allows states to identify, in certain circumstances, whether their counterpart is a 
“greedy state” or a mere “security-seeker”.161 
 
Whether one sees the security dilemma as a phenomenon stemming from misconception or 
rational decision-making, it’s long-lasting presence in international relations discourse and 
acceptance – in one way or the other – by different schools of thoughts162 has proven its 
value to understanding the relations governing certain constellations of states. Its strikingly 
                                                 
156 Lower cost could mean, as described, lower vulnerability of the state, but also compatible ideologies or 
social systems. Ibid. pp172-174 
157 Ibid. p176 
158 Ibid. pp180-181 
159 This is extensively discussed in ibid. pp186-214 
160 This would obviously not be the case if one of the states was not able to match its adversary’s increases.  
For the other reasons identified by Glaser, see footnote 153. Glaser, Charles L. (1997): “The Security Dilema 
Revisited”, in World Politics 50, No. 1 (October 1997) pp174-175, 178 
161 Ibid. pp178-183 
162 As well as its application to a variety of important thematic issues. Ibid. pp172-173 
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simple logic renders it interesting for viewing under different theoretical approaches, and 
has therefore taken an important place in theoretical observations of the situation on the 
Korean peninsula. 
 
3.5 The Korean Peninsula as a Part of Wider North East Asian Security 
As noted earlier, theoretical approaches to the East Asian163 security constellation have 
long reflected one, or elements of both of the two paradigms described on the preceding 
pages.  When asked about the future of the region, realists and neorealists traditionally tend 
to strike a pessimistic tone, interpreting China’s growing economic, and especially military 
might164, and the ensuing emergence of a multipolar order165 (as opposed to the foregoing 
Pax Americana166) as signs of a more belligerent East Asia prone to conflicts.167 Military 
build-up by South East Asian countries and India, as well as the heightened attention paid 
by the countries in the region to issues of unresolved territorial disputes and maritime 
delimitation, are seen as beginning signs of balancing behaviour among these states and 
fuel such expectations. 168  These developments are deemed especially foreboding in 
conjunction with a perceived reduction of US military commitment to the region. Another 
argument resonating in realists’ pessimist view of East Asia is an asserted relative lack of 
ties and linkages among the states in the region. The perceived low degree of 
                                                 
163 As years of scholarly research have brought forth a variety of geographical understandings of Asia, East 
Asia and North East Asia, it seems appropriate to offer at least a vaguely defining concept to be used as 
reference with regards to this study. For the purpose of the following observations, North East Asia shall refer 
to China, the Korean peninsula, Japan and the Russian Federation. East Asia, on the other hand, shall include 
that grouping plus the South East Asian countries. India shall be included only in the context of its role in 
relation to China’s rise as an East Asian/North East Asian regional power. 
164 Discussing the issue of Japan, neo-realist champion Kenneth Waltz suggested that for an economic power 
not to become a great power is a “structural anomaly”. Contending obvious historic reasons for Japan and 
Germany not to have done so, he nevertheless suggests that this would probably change in the near future. 
Consequently, neo-realists argue that for China not to become a full great power would amount to a structural 
anomaly. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993): “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, in International 
Security 18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993) pp66-67 
165  Mulitpolar systems are considered to increase the likelihood of miscalculations and its negative 
consequences. Snyder, Glenn H./Diesing, Paul (1977): Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-
Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton University Press, Princeton pp430-431 
166 Pempel, T.J. (2010): “More Pax, Less Americana in Asia”, in International Relations of the Asia Pacific 
10, No. 3 (September 2010) pp465-466 
167 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p510.  See also Friedberg, Aaron L. (1993): “Ripe for Rivalry: 
Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, in International Security 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-1994) pp28-30; 
and Glaser, Charles (2011): “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism”, in 
Foreign Affairs 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011) p81 
168 Ibid. pp17-18. See also Acharya, Amitav (2003): “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?”, in International 
Security 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003-2004) pp150-152; and Li, Rex (2009): A rising China and security in East 
Asia. Identity construction and security discourse. Routledge, London p11 
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interconnectedness in the region in terms of economic integration, institutionalization and 
security cooperation leads realists such as Aaron L. Friedberg to assume that Asia is “ripe 
for rivalry”. 169  North East Asian regional cooperation in particular is not expected to 
incrementally increase in the near future.170  
 
Interestingly, liberal commentators attach their main arguments for a more optimistic view 
of the region to the very same issues raised by their realist colleagues. Needless to say, 
however, their interpretation of conditions differs fundamentally from their colleagues’. 
While realists point to the weakness of East Asian institutions as a reason for future 
conflicts in the region, liberals see the development of organizations such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC) and even the Six Party Talks as a “maturing institutional framework… 
[which] will provide the basis for a prosperous and peaceful Asia”.171 Equally, increasing 
intensity of economic interdependence in the region and beyond is perceived as a 
decreasing factor in the likelihood of future conflict.172 This is, among others, attributed to 
the very source of realism’s pessimism: China’s rise as a power in and its corollary 
investment in the international economic system are considered conducive to regional 
economic interdependence173, which in turn influences the implications of China’s rise for 
the region.174 As Rex Li puts it, liberalists contend that “a China that is increasingly linked 
                                                 
169 Friedberg, Aaron L. (1993): “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia“, in International 
Security 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-1994) pp19-27. See also Kim, Ki-Jung (2005): “Establishing Peace on the 
Korean Peninsula”, in Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005) p491; and 169 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The 
Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 
(Winter 2008) p510. Amitav Acharya finds this striking, given that “Northeast Asia appears to be a more 
culturally homogenous universe than South East Asia” where trough ASEAN a certain degree of 
institutionalization was achieved. Acharya, Amitav (2003): “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order. 
Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change”, in Alagappa, Muthiah (Ed.): Asian Security Order: 
instrumental and normative features. Stanford University Press, Stanford p217. Realists would consider this 
probably less striking than rather obvious given the existing structural constraints. 
170 Rozman, Gilbert (2008): “Northeast Asian regionalism at a crossroads: Is an East Asian Community in 
sight?“, in Timmermann, Martina/Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo (Ed.): Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps 
towards global governance. United Nations University Press, Tokyo p83 
171 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p511. See also Snyder, Scott (2008): “Prospects for a Northeast 
Asia Security Framework”, entrance to the conference Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community: 
Implications for Korea’s Growth and Economic Development (15 October 2008), Washington D.C. pp5-6 
Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in 
Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) pp510-511. See also Acharya, Amitav (2003): “Will Asia’s Past Be 
Its Future?”, in International Security 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003-2004) pp157-158 
173 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p511 
174 Acharya, Amitav (2003): “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order. Norms, Power, and Prospects 
for Peaceful Change”, in Alagappa, Muthiah (Ed.): Asian Security Order: instrumental and normative 
features. Stanford University Press, Stanford pp230-231 
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to the world economy and has an interdependent relationship with its trading partners is less 
likely to take aggressive actions that will be detrimental to its own economic interests.”175 
 
However, among the multitude of opinions and comments relating these two traditional 
approaches to East Asian security studies, other voices exist which deny the absolute 
applicability of the traditional international relations theories to the developments on the 
Asian continent in general.176 They criticize the eurocentrist nature of these schools of 
thought, even questioning the comparability of Asian states to their European counterparts 
as far as internal development processes, historic and present, are concerned.177 They argue 
that while economic and political institutions in Asia remain rather weak, South Asian 
states have not, as expected by realist scholars, countered the growing military potential of 
China with a military build-up of their own, instead bandwagoning in China’s wake.178 
Liberal expectations are equally questioned by scholars arguing for increased attention to 
the regional context of international relations. In a comprehensive empirical study of Asian 
international relations, Benjamin E. Goldsmith shows that while economic interdependence 
is a strong factor in peaceful relations in Asia, international organizations and, notably, 
democratic governance do not necessarily have a positive effect.179 Needless to say, such 
argumentations are on their part equally vulnerable to criticism. While Kang’s assumptions 
concerning Asian states’ balancing behaviour may have seemed reasonably true at the turn 
                                                 
175 Li, Rex (2009): A rising China and security in East Asia. Identity construction and security discourse. 
Routledge, London pp12-13 
176 For prominent examples see Kang, David C. (2003): “Getting Asia Wrong. The Need for New Analytical 
Frameworks”, in International Security 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003) pp57-85; and Goldsmith, Benjamin E. (2007): 
“A Liberal Peace in Asia?”, in Journal of Peace Research 44, No. 1 (January 2007) pp5-27 
177  Kang, David C. (2003): “Getting Asia Wrong. The Need for New Analytical Frameworks”, in 
International Security 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003) pp57-58, 83-85 
178 Ibid. pp64, 70, 79-81, 82. Kang goes even further to suggest that historically, periods characterized by a 
strong China were more peaceful than those marked by a weakened China. Consequently he suggests one 
possible way of development might be for large parts of Asia to acquiesce to historically precedented Chinese 
leadership in a hierarchical system, echoing earlier arguments by, notably, Asian thinkers that Asians would 
“accept hierarchy”, a possible condition for peace in the region. Ibid. pp66-67, 70, 82-83; and Mahbubani, 
Kishore (1995): “The Pacific Impulse”, in Mahbubani, Kishore (Ed.): Can Asians Think?. Marshal Cavendish 
International, Singapore p173. These arguments are however largely refuted by Amitav Acharya. Acharya, 
Amitav (2003): “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?”, in International Security 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003-2004) 
pp150-157. Park Seo-Hyun provides an extensive analysis of Korea’s and Japan’s historical development in 
the context of the replacement of the traditional Sinocentric hierarchy with the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty, concluding that “despite the demise of the traditional Sinocentric system in East Asia, the legacy 
of the hierarchical worldview can be found in the sensitivity towards ‘Great Powers’ shown in the political 
debates of contemporary Japan and Korea.” Park. Seo-Hyun (2008): “Security Strategies in Hierarchical Asia: 
A Comparison of Japan and Korea in the Sinocentric Order”, entrance to the 49th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association (26-29 March 2008), San Francisco 
179 Goldsmith, Benjamin E. (2007): “A Liberal Peace in Asia?”, in Journal of Peace Research 44, No. 1 
(January 2007) pp11-18, 22. It should be noted however that for his purposes Goldsmith chooses the widest 
possible definition of Asia. 
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of the century, recent years have shown that the last word in these developments has not yet 
been spoken – to the contrary, as discussed, Southeast Asian countries are currently 
increasingly inclined to show military strength in order to counter China’s assertions of 
power, such as territorial claims in the South China Sea.180 As for Goldsmith’s study, it 
could be argued that his findings on the impact of democracy on Asian relations largely 
depend on his wide interpretation of the term democracy as employed in connection with 
Kantian expectations for peace.181 Nevertheless, the notion that Asia as such might require 
an innovative approach to international relations theory, allowing for the critical 
examination of some assumptions of the traditional schools of thought, should not be cast 
aside easily given that relations among Asian states are still developing following the end 
of the Cold War. 
 
3.6 A Theoretical Approach to Inter-Korean Relations 
Having examined the major theoretical paradigms in East Asian international relations, the 
central question presenting itself is how these relate to the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula, which constitutes the setting for the NLL dispute. The answer is twofold: While 
on the one hand central aspects of the approaches discussed play an important role in 
understanding both Koreas’ behaviour when interacting with each other or third parties, it is, 
on the other hand, important to acknowledge that issues on the Korean peninsula are 
closely related to processes and constellations prevailing in the wider region.182 
 
Theoretically analysing the behaviour of the central actors on the Korean peninsula, the 
DPRK and the ROK, requires a look at the constituting elements of inter-Korean relations. 
Two sovereign states183, geographically adjacent with few separating geographic elements 
                                                 
180 It might show that after all, Kang’s assertion that “a dozen years would seem to be long enough to detect at 
least some change” in the balancing behaviour of the states in the region, was too shortsighted. Kang, David C. 
(2003): “Getting Asia Wrong. The Need for New Analytical Frameworks”, in International Security 27, No. 4 
(Spring 2003) p63 
181 While different conceptions of democracy exist, democratic peace theory often tends to employ a narrower 
definition. For example see Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor (1996): “Kant, Democracy, and History”, in Journal of 
Democracy 7, No. 4 (October 1996) p137. A critical alternative conception of liberal democracy can be found 
in Grayson, Kyle (2003): “Democratic Peace Theory as Practice: (Re)Reading the Significance of Liberal 
Representations of War and Peace” (= York Centre for International Security Studies Working Paper No. 22), 
on http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/WP22-Grayson.pdf, 04.12.2011 
182 Kim Ki-Jung provides a concise discussion of this correlationKim, Ki-Jung (2005): “Establishing Peace on 
the Korean Peninsula”, in Korea Observer 36, No. 3 (Autumn 2005) pp494-495 
183 Here, for the purpose of theoretically analyzing international relations in the region, the undisputed de 
facto existence of two separate sovereign states shall be interpreted as constituting two sovereign states in the 
sense of sovereign units of the international system. 
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offering constraint to possible military activities, face each other in a de jure state of war 
which promotes a climate of mistrust, keeping economic interdependence at a minimum. 
While, as will later be discussed, economic cooperation does exist and South Korea is 
actually an important trading partner of the North 184 , this cooperation remains highly 
politicized and is heavily dependent on certain pioneering projects promoted by the 
respective leaderships.185 If one was to observe only these two states, and assume that they 
both constitute rational actors in a world of anarchy, defined by the lack of a superordinate 
power to enforce the adherence to any set of rules, on would find it hard not to describe 
them as epitomizing a practical example of realist worldview. Both states struggle for 
security and survival, with increased threat perceptions on both sides due to the high level 
of armament on the peninsula and the unclear status of their relation under the international 
law. As both sides are mistrustful and uncertain of each other’s motives – to the contrary, 
given the lack of a regulatory framework and a superseding actor to enforce it, they 
constantly have to assume the worst – any move to increase one’s security is interpreted by 
the other as a move to decrease its own, resulting in a classic security dilemma. 
 
However, for some commentators the explanation of international relations on the Korean 
peninsula as a realist constellation of two units of similar characteristics struggling for 
security does not sufficiently capture the foreign policy behaviour on both sides. In general, 
they are dissatisfied with the notion that states are nothing but unitary actors invariably 
striving for security in the face of anarchy.186 Instead, these constructivists stress a central 
element which according to their view not only defines states, but also the system they act 
in: identity.187 
 
In his pioneering article Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics, Alexander Wendt does not criticize neorealists and, as he calls them, 
neoliberals for their assumption of anarchy as the structure of international relations, but 
                                                 
184 Inter-Korean economic cooperation is characterized by a stark imbalance, with the main flow running from 
South to North. In 2007 it constituted 61.2% of  North Korean total trade. Hwang, Eui-Gak (2008): “Inter-
Korean Economic Cooperation: The Need for Reciprocity” (= The International Centre for the Study of East 
Asian Development Working Paper Series No. 2008-19) pp2, 19, 24-25 
185 Ibid. p2 
186 Schörnig, Niklas (2010): “Neorealismus”, in Schieder, Sigfried/Spindler, Manuela (Ed.): Theorien der 
Internationalen Beziehungen. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen/Farmington Hills p91 
187 Filzmaier, Peter/Höll, Otmar et al (2006): Internationale Politik. WUV, Wien p98 
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rather for interpreting it wrongly.188 He rejects the notion that due to the anarchic structure 
of the system, all states’ interests should be restricted to self-help.189 Instead, he argues, 
interests and identities are not fixed and can thus differ between individual states and even 
transform. As a consequence, the international system, which is constituted by interactions 
and social processes among the units (states), is not necessarily anarchic, but constructed. 
“If today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not nature”.190  At 
the core of Wendt’s criticism therefore lies the contention that the traditional approaches in 
international relations theory were wrong to assume that both actors (“agents”) and anarchy 
(“structure”) are given units, making no effort to explain their properties and how they 
influence each other. 191 
 
Inter-Korean relations seem to be a particularly promising field for constructivist scholars 
to study. On the one hand, they point to the common identity of the two states as the 
Korean nation.192 This is interpreted as the driving factor of two major determinants of their 
foreign policy, one being their contest for rightful political leadership on the peninsula193, 
the other one being cooperative engagement policies by the South, such as Kim Dae-jung’s 
much quoted sunshine policy.194 On the other hand, they see the need to include internal 
factors such as ideology and collective values into the analysis of states’ behaviour, 
observable on the peninsula in the North’s promotion of central ideologies, most notably 
Juche195, and its identity as a socialist country and the perception of so-called Western 
                                                 
188 Wendt, Alexander (1992): “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 
in International Organization 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992) p396 
189 Ibid. p396 
190 Ibid. p394-395 
191  Wendt, Alexander (1987): “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, in 
International Organization 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987) p349 
192 Shin, Gi-Wook/Burke, Kristin C. (2009): “North Korea and Contending South Korean Identities: Analysis 
of the South Korean Media; Policy Implications for the United States”, in Korea Economic Institute of 
America Academic Papers Series On Korea 1 (2009) pp152-153 
193 Ibid. p152 
194 Bluth, Christoph (2008): Korea. Polity Press, Cambridge/Malden p175. See also Kellogg, Anita Renda 
(2010): “From Enemy to Brother: The Reconstruction of North Korean Identity in the South Korean 
Imagination”, entrance to the 51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (17-20 February 
2010), New Orleans p2; and Kemfelja, Beatrix (2006): Das Verhältnis der Republik Korea zu seinem 
Nachbarn im Norden. Ein konstruktivistischer Ansatz. Diploma Thesis, University of Vienna, Vienna p83 
195 Grace Lee describes the role Juche plays in dictating North Korean’s foreign policy, intensifying the 
North’s isolated position. Lee, Grace (2003): “The Political Philosophy of Juche”, in Stanford Journal of East 
Asian Affairs 3 (Summer 2003) pp106, 112. See also Park, Jae Kyu (1987): “Introduction: A Basic 
Framework for Understanding North Korea’s Foreign Policy”, in Park, Jae Kyu (Ed.): The Foreign Relations 
of North Korea: New Perspectives. Kyungnam University Press, Seoul pp5, 20-21 
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values shared by the South. 196  Equally, reflecting constructivism’s accommodation of 
individuals as constructors of state identity197, constructivists observe the degree to which 
North Korean foreign policy is influenced by individual leadership of the paramount leader 
Kim Jong-il.198 
 
As a consequence of such consideration, Christoph Bluth attempts to redefine the security 
dilemma, which he does perceive as a decisive element on the peninsula but considers to be 
“of a different nature than the classic security dilemma”.199 Instead of a, as he quotes David 
Kang saying, “zero sum battle for the Korean nation” where “North and South Korea view 
each other as dangerous and illegitimate states, and each views compromise as tantamount 
to surrender”200, Bluth sees the Korean security dilemma as an internal dilemma of North 
Korea – the need for fundamental reform to ensure regime survival and avoid collapse 
colluding with the perception that fundamental reform would result in just that.201 
 
While Bluth’s argumentation does provide a number of valuable insights into inter-Korean 
relations, his conclusions on the security dilemma are unfortunately not as coherent as his 
obvious expertise on Korean issues would suggest. Without doubt his account accurately 
describes a dilemma posing a serious headache to the North Korean leadership. However, 
he is wrong in outrightly rejecting the notion of a classical security dilemma, reflecting 
external security perceptions, being the major driver of foreign policy behaviour on the 
peninsula. Bluth bases his analysis on two assumptions, one being that the threat perceived 
most imminent by the North, US support for South Korea, is in reality insubstantial given 
the obvious assurances by the US and the international community at large not to launch a 
military strike, and the other being that the North Korean leadership’s dilemma on reform 
                                                 
196 Christoph Bluth illustrates this with the example of US-Soviet relations which according to him were 
characterized by ideology and values. Criticizing neorealism’s structural explanations for the Cold War, he 
notes that “while this description … is useful in some respects, it leaves out various other factors, such as 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, authoritarian or totalitarian governments and the shared values in the West 
including personal freedom, human rights and democracy. It can be argued that a theory that ignores the 
major salient factors that determine how the agents think about the power relationships that they are involved 
with, and how they define their interests and goals, is not complete.” Bluth, Christoph (2008): Korea. Polity 
Press, Cambridge/Malden p176. An extensive study of the role of historically constructed identity in the 
Korean security dilemma can be found in Bleiker, Roland (2005): Divided Korea. Toward a Culture of 
Reconciliation. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis pp1-60 
197  Bozdağlioğlu, Yücel (2007): “Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive Approach”, in 
Review of International Law and Politics 3, No. 11 (2007) p138 
198 Yong, Sub Choi (2005): “A Short Review on Pyongyang’s Foreign-Policymaking Process” (= East-West 
Center Working Papers: International Graduate Student Conference Series No. 14) pp5-9, 13 
199 Bluth, Christoph (2008): Korea. Polity Press, Cambridge/Malden p169 
200 Cited in ibid. p182  
201 Ibid. pp183-185 
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and regime survival is an exclusively internal issue. 202  At the same time, he himself 
provides the arguments to dispute these assumptions. He clearly states that “Northern 
leaders articulate the threat as emanating form the ‘hostile attitude’ of the United States” in 
both military and political terms. 203  In claiming that these conceptions ought to be 
irrelevant due to assurances by the international community, Bluth resembles Charles L. 
Glaser’s statesmen “who do not understand the security dilemma and therefore do a poor 
job of appreciating the choices faced by their adversary”, making the key mistake for a state 
“to assume that others know it is interested only in security”.204 At the same time, his 
description does not seem very appreciative of Robert Jervis’ deliberations on security 
perception in the security dilemma, expecting a high degree of mistrust and suspicion from 
a state which finds itself in a situation threatening its very existence.205 If the North’s 
leadership sees the survival of its regime threatened, as Bluth repeatedly contends, this 
aspect does deserve some attention when considering threat perception on the peninsula. 
Bluth’s assumption on the North’s reform dilemma – which he describes as the true 
security dilemma – can be equally disputed in his own words. He suggests that the true 
security dilemma pertains to the need and danger of reform in the North, which he 
considers and inherently internal issue, while the classical security dilemma cannot explain 
situations such as the South’s sunshine policy. However, he does mention that the sunshine 
policy was planned as a specific measure aimed at bringing about unification on the South’s 
terms206, in line with the South’s and the Western world’s desire to “see North Korea 
disappear as an entity in the future.”207 It seems as if Bluth either considers the security 
dilemma and threat perception in general as a strictly military element, or has not given 
these correlations any consideration, both of which do not strengthen his arguments’ 
coherence. 
 
For the reasons shown in above discussion it makes sense to suggest that while valuable 
insights to the DPRK’s foreign policy might be gained from a constructivist perspective, 
purely North-South related issues show the important role realist approaches may still play 
                                                 
202 Ibid. pp173, 183, 185 
203 Ibid. p182 
204 Glaser, Charles L. (1997): “The Security Dilema Revisited”, in World Politics 50, No. 1 (October 1997) 
p182 
205 Jervis, Robert (1978): “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” in World Politics 30, No. 2 (January 
1978), p172 
206 Bluth, Christoph (2008): Korea. Polity Press, Cambridge/Malden pp92-93 
207 Ibid. p183 
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in the region. The two states face each other in a severe security dilemma, which is being 
increased by the cultural homogeneity of the Korean people and the absence of 
geographical barriers to conflict.208 Either side’s efforts to increase its security is perceived 
as an acute threat by the other side, which in turn responds by equal measures. The NLL, 
with its history of manoeuvres and firing drills, is an excellent example for this 
constellation.  
 
Interestingly, it seems that the only factor actively moderating the Korean security dilemma 
is the internationalization of the issue. Within their realist standoff, they see themselves 
backed by a regional power, China for the North and the United States for the South 
respectively, but as soon as these and other regional actors are actually involved, most 
likely as they see their own interests endangered, economic integration creates a momentum 
most aptly described by liberal institutionalism. The prisoner’s dilemma without doubt still 
plays a role in this constellation, but increasing economic interdependence and growing 
institutionalization continuously add to its decrease. This was particularly visible when, 
within hours of the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, both China 
and the United States in first reactions called for stability on the peninsula. 209 It also 
explains, for example, China’s increasingly close relationship with the ROK, mainly based 
on trade, even at times when the North sees itself threatened by its Southern neighbour. In 
general, Sino-Korean relations are of particular importance to these assumptions, both in 
terms of South and North Korea. On the one hand, if China sees the ROK as an important 
regional trading partner instead of just a bridgehead for US forces in its vicinity, it is more 
likely to exert a moderating influence on North Korean foreign policy and inter-Korean 
relations. On the other hand, it is China’s particular relation210 to North Korea which make 
the assumption of regional interdependence as a moderating factor possible. As both the 
likely North Korean view of its surroundings and its reliance on Juche ideology do not 
                                                 
208 David Kang cited in ibid. p182 
209  BBC News (2011): “North Korean leader Kim Jong-il dies of heart attack”, BBC News, on 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693, 03.01.2012. Michael Horowitz denies that China is the sole 
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the only actor with the ability to effectively leverage North Korea is incorrect, the significance of its influence 
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Pyongyang”, in The Washington Quarterly 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004-2005) p41 
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favour its integration into regional frameworks, China’s influence is at times the only way 
to include the North in Northeast Asia’s integration processes, economic or otherwise. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the different approaches chosen to theoretically analyze 
international relations in modern Asia. It is equally important to understand that for the 
Korean peninsula, all these approaches may be applied, if at different levels, as such an 
understanding may eventually allow for a more reliable glimpse onto future developments. 
While the neorealist security dilemma makes it hard for either side to make concessions, 
prolonging and reinforcing the conflicts on issues such as the NLL, the liberal notion of 
economic interdependence and integration in international institutions as conducive to 
peace shows that moderating influence by other actors is possible, possibly allowing for 
solutions in issues where outside powers see their interests weakened. 211 To put these 
assumptions to the test however, and to see to what extent they may allow for conclusions 
on future developments, it is necessary to examine other constitutive factors to the conflict, 
such as the positions of the two sides directly involved, the stances of the other major actors 
with a stake in the region, the legal and economic frameworks they act in, and, as a starting 
point, the status quo of affairs on the Korean peninsula. 
 
 
4. The Korean Peninsula today  
Without doubt, two issues have dominated headlines concerning the Korean peninsula in 
recent years. On the one hand, naval clashes and incidents along the NLL and the mostly 
verbal sable-rattling following naval exercises in the region regularly elicit global concerns 
over inter-Korean relations and what an outbreak of open hostilities might mean for the 
world. On the other hand, usually highly publicised news of developments and progress in 
the DPRK’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapon capability remind the world that though 
the USSR might have dissolved at the end of the last century, the nuclear threat of the Cold 
War is hardly a thing of the past. Both issues share a common treat, in that they, especially 
for Western observers, serve as a reminder that disagreement between two small states, at 
                                                 
211 Terence Roehrig arrives at a similar conclusion, albeit slightly less optimistic, noting that “even if liberal-
institutionalism becomes the dominant theoretical explanation, flash points such as the NLL will continue to 
make realism relevant. Moreover, it will require vigilance among the players in the region to ensure that 
disputes such as the NLL do not escalate and engulf East Asia in a larger conflict.” Roehrig, Terence (2008): 
“The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 
(Winter 2008) p512 
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the easternmost edge of the map, might under certain circumstances inevitably evolve into a 
war which would affect all. 
 
However, these two issues are but facets of the wider subject of inter-Korean relations. 
While it is not wrong to say that relations are marked by partition, there is significantly 
more to it than the dispute over maritime delimitation and the North’s continuous attempts 
to engineer nuclear weapons. Conventional military potential plays a more important role in 
inter-Korean relations than common focus on the North’s nuclear weapons programme 
would suggest. Both sides’ rhetoric ranges from bellicose accusations to affirmation of the 
allegedly ultimate objective of peaceful unification, notwithstanding their substantially 
different opinions about what such a unified Korea should look like. Legitimacy is a 
persistent question, with both sides asserting that they are the sole legitimate 
representatives of the Korean nation and accusing the other side of treachery. All the while 
both sides tend to promote economic cooperation, ostensibly for political reasons, though 
both sides arguably seem to increasingly appreciate the economic benefits. As discussed in 
the previous chapters, international actors have traditionally influenced the situation on the 
peninsula, and they continue to do so though possibly under different conditions than in the 
20th century. All these conditions are part of the wider picture of inter-Korean relations, and 
as such greatly influence developments in the NLL dispute while at the same time being 
significantly influenced by it.  
 
4.1 Partition along the MDL 
Central characteristic of any inter-Korean contact is, needless to say, partition of the nation 
along the MDL as prescribed by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. As the parties to the 
conflict, both during the armistice negotiations and the following political consultations 
aimed at securing a final peace settlement212, could not come to mutual agreement on a 
                                                 
212 Regular meetings between the sides took place in the framework of the Military Armistice Commission 
(MAC) established in Art. IIB of the Armistice Agreement. Art. IV recommends to hold, within three months 
after the agreement was signed, a high-level political conference to negotiate questions in achieving lasting 
peace. A conference was held in 1954 in Geneva but ended without results. “Agreement between the 
Commander-in.Chief, United Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army 
and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. Signed at 
Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953”, in International Organization 7, No. 4 (November 1953) pp617-620, 628; 
and Smith, Raymond C. (????): Peacekeeping without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice 
Arrangements. Thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in 
United Nations Peace Support Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute, Williamsburg, on 
http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/smith.pdf, 04.12.2011 p9 
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demarcation line at sea213, the MDL as defined in the Armistice Agreement serves as 
demarcation line on land only. Commencing from the east coast of the peninsula, just south 
of the North Korean county of Kosong, the MDL traverses the whole peninsula in a 
southwest-ward direction, ending at the northeastern edge of the Han River estuary.214 The 
line is flanked on both sides by a two kilometres wide strip of land, the DMZ. While the 
NLL has in recent years been a hotspot of inter-Korean violence, such events have 
continuously and significantly decreased along the MDL. In the late 1960s several 
skirmishes between North and South in and around the DMZ gave rise to the popular 
imagination of a ‘Quiet War’215, events which brought to the peninsula to the very brink of 
an all-out war, and up to 1978 incidents such as the 1976 Axe Murder Incident, when two 
US Army officers were killed while trimming a tree in the DMZ, and the discovery of 
various tunnels dug by the North underneath the DMZ, ostensibly intended as a way to 
infiltrate the South, significantly heightened tensions but remained short of escalating the 
conflict.216 Since then, however, no major violent confrontation has taken place over the 
MDL, while the NLL was at the focus of numerous incidents.217 There are a number of 
reasons for this discrepancy, the most important probably being that as a demarcation line 
on land, the MDL is simply much easier to fortify and physically control than a wide body 
of water such as the NLL area. While incidents at the NLL have often been triggered by 
fishing vessels crossing the line218, it is hard to imagine a civilian to get anywhere near the 
MDL on land without either noticing it or being noticed by someone. At the same time, 
while a demarcation line at sea leaves a certain ambiguity over its exact location resulting 
in room for actors to argue about their own position relative to the line219, both the MDL 
and the DMZ are required by the Armistice Agreement to be clearly marked.220  
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214 United States Department of State (1963): “Korea ‘Military Demarcation Line’ Boundary” (= International 
Boundary Study No. 22) p2 
215 Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan (2000): “The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitarized 
Zone, 1966-1969”, in The Journal of Military History 64, No. 2 (April 2000) p439 
216  Center for Strategic & International Studies (2010): “Record of North Korea’s Major Conventional 
Provocations since 1960s”, on http://csis.org/files/publication/100525_North_Koreas_Provocations.pdf, 
04.12.2011 pp2-3 
217 Ibid. Pp3-5 
218 Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary 
Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) pp143-145; See also Roehrig, 
Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in Korea 
Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) pp513-514. Roehrig infers as much when suggesting that “it is no 
coincidence that the two major naval clashes occurred in June, the height of the blue crab season.” Ibid. p515 
219 One such example was the 2007 case of British navy servicemen who were captured by Iranian forces on 
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A second reason is that, in contrast to the NLL, the MDL is an agreed-upon line clearly 
designated in the Armistice Agreement and accepted by all parties as the line of separation. 
There are no questions as to whether its presently observed geographical location 
corresponds to its actual position, and neither side’s behaviour since the Korean War gave 
reason to doubt that they de facto accept the MDL as the demarcation line, though as a 
temporary military measure only. While both sides are engaged in a dispute of legitimacy, 
which undoubtedly has certain implications for the MDL with regards to its legal status as a 
boundary221, this does not necessarily translate into a territorial dispute. This is not to say 
that contested legitimacy and sovereignty are not a crucial aspect of the NLL dispute.222 
However, it does show that notwithstanding a severe case of disputed legitimacy of the two 
governments a demarcation line can, if properly institutionalized, serve as a stabilizing 
factor.  
 
A third reason for the relative stability of the MDL in recent years is the DMZ itself. The 
DMZ, established as a “buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead 
to a resumption of hostilities”223, has, notwithstanding aforementioned incidents within its 
vicinity, over the years proven to be an effective tool for preventing or containing 
confrontation between the two sides’ military forces. This can be attributed to two factors. 
On the one hand, military strength within the DMZ is highly regulated, and originally any 
individual entering the zone was to be subject to approval by the Military Armistice 
Commission (MAC)224. The Armistice Agreement requires for the number of civilian or 
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Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the 
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222 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p516 
223 Armistice Agreement Art. I Paragraph 1. “Agreement between the Commander-in.Chief, United Nations 
Command, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
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military personnel entering the DMZ in either side of the MDL not to exceed 1,000225, 
effectively barring either side from deploying large numbers of troops to the immediate 
vicinity of the boundary.  
 
On the other hand, the DMZ is subject to effective international supervision. While the 
UNC, which as signatory to the Armistice Agreement was designated to administer the 
southern side of the DMZ, was at the time due to its participation in the conflict not viewed 
as an observer mission, the agreement provided for the establishment of a Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission (NNSC) charged with “functions of supervision, inspection and 
investigation” of adherence to the agreement by the parties. 226  However, the NNSC, 
originally made up of officers from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland 
respectively, encountered numerous obstacles to its mission, such as its reduction to role of 
a mere relay for reports submitted by the two sides following the UNC’s expulsion of the 
Commission from South Korean port facilities in response to the North’s alleged non-
compliance with control mechanism 227  and the withdrawal of nominations of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland by the DPRK following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc.228 
Although the DPRK now considers the NNSC as defunct 229, Sweden and Switzerland 
continue to uphold a small presence of international observers in the DMZ. 
 
At the same time, involvement of the UNC has taken on a very different form in recent 
years. With the increasing assumption of security duties on the southern side of the DMZ 
by ROK Army personnel, involvement of foreign UNC personnel has largely been reduced 
to political functions such as participation in the General Officers Talks. As such it 
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continues to conduct regular guard post inspections on the southern side of the DMZ, 
routinely including military liaison officers from countries which had provided troops to the 
UNC during the war. Notwithstanding the UNC’s status as participant in the Korean War 
and party to the Armistice Agreement, the presence of such international unarmed missions 
does contribute significantly to the international supervision of activities in the DMZ.230 
 
Ironically, as much as both North and South Korea maintain that the MDL is but a military 
measure, it has today more than ever rather political implications than military ones. It 
should not be mistakenly believed that the DMZ would provide some kind of 
insurmountable obstacle to one of the parties willing to engage the other in open conflict.  
 
4.2 The role of conventional forces along the MDL 
As Viktor D. Cha and David C. Kang point out, when US President Clinton ventured to say 
that the DMZ was “the scariest place in the world”, he was probably less thinking about 
dangers lurking within the DMZ than rather of the concentrated military deployment along 
both sides of it.231 While the global availability of long-range weapons systems such as 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) able of carrying nuclear warheads from one 
corner of the planet to another, has since the Korean War generally relativised the notion of 
fortified boundaries, in the particular case of the Korean DMZ the positive effects of a non-
militarized area separating opposing troops are easily offset by far more conventional 
classes of arms. A four kilometres wide stretch of land, be it heavily fortified or not, can 
hardly prevent even less-than-modern conventional weapons systems from reaching the 
other side of the line. On the Korean peninsula this is all the more drastic with regards to 
the location of the South Korean capital, Seoul, in relative vicinity to the DMZ, where the 
DPRK is suspected to have deployed the majority of its up to 8,500 artillery pieces.232 Even 
though previous incidents have hinted at possible deficits in the North’s artillery troops 
firing accuracy and effectiveness, possibly due to lack of proper training and poor quality of 
                                                 
230  Smith, Raymond C. (????): Peacekeeping without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice 
Arrangements. Thesis presented in partial completion of the requirements of the Certificate-of-Training in 
United Nations Peace Support Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute, Williamsburg, on 
http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/smith.pdf, 04.12.2011 p14 
231 Cha, Viktor D./Kang, David C. (2003): “The Korea Crisis”, in Foreign Policy, No. 136 (May/June 2003) 
p24 
232 Cordesman, Anthony H. (2011): The Korean Military Balance. Comparative Korean Forces and the 
Forces of Key Neighboring States. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C. pp88-89 
  - 53 - 
ammunition or storage thereof233, these forces would invariably inflict heavy damage to 
Seoul and other areas on the peninsula, leading some observers to conclude that this alone 
serves as a sufficient deterrent against possible attacks against the North.234  
 
However, Northern artillery deployment is but one aspect of the North-South military 
balance. Both sides have deployed large concentrations of force along the MDL, with some 
sources suggesting that on the Northern side, the DPRK has deployed 70 per cent of total 
military units, corresponding to up to 80 per cent of its firepower in the relative vicinity of 
the DMZ.235 Comparing both sides’ conventional military strength to each other can be a 
complicated issue. While the North surpasses the South in almost any military category in 
terms of raw numbers, this is largely offset by the technical superiority of South Korean 
equipment and training.236 Nevertheless, North Korea’s quantitative superiority is at times 
staggering. Overall manpower available to the DPRK reaches up to 1.19 million personnel 
as compared to the ROK’s 655,000. Relations are equally one-sided when it comes to tanks 
(3,900 as compared to 2,300), multiple launcher rocket systems which play an important 
part in the North’s aforementioned artillery deployment (5,100 as compared to 200), naval 
vessels including submarines as well as fighter planes.237 A particular imbalance applies to 
both side’s Special Forces, which in the North consist of a staggering 200,000 men, ten 
times as many as in the South.238 The North’s Special Forces are made up of highly trained 
light units intended for quick, and possibly undetected infiltration of the South prior to or 
during conflict.239 These are seen as crucial in any scenario of a possible North Korean 
invasion of the South, as analysts anticipate that due to the technology gap and US support 
for the South the ROK would quickly establish air superiority unless the necessary facilities 
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are destroyed prior to mobilization, a plan which could only be executed through extensive 
deployment of Special Forces by the DPRK.240 
 
In an effort to account for South Korea’s technological advantage and compile a clearer and 
more realistic picture of the actual military balance between the two sides, alternative 
models of analysis of overall military strength have been applied to the Korean situation, 
but the results did not necessarily reveal the great gaps that had been expected given the 
assumptions about South Korea’s more advanced equipment and training. 241  Experts 
therefore continue to disagree over results and implications of a hypothetical attack by the 
North, with some maintaining that due to a variety of factors such as lack of progress in 
South Korea’s efforts to modernize and restructure its armed forces and the North’s 
offensive strategy, North Korea could possibly prevail in such an engagement242, whereas 
others maintain that the South could repeal such an attempt even without US support.243  
 
Such scenarios, hypothetic as they may be, build of course on the assumption that the 
DPRK is deeply interested in bringing about unification under its terms, going so far as that 
it would risk a war to either fully overthrow the ROK government or, less ambitiously, 
achieve limited but key strategic goals to secure and strengthen its own positions. While 
some commentators, pointing amongst others to the North’s promotion of Seongun 
policy244, view this as the obvious goal of North Korean strategic and political thinking245, 
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others conclude that as bellicose as the DPRK’s rhetoric might at times be, rhetoric is just 
what the idea of unification under the North’s terms has come to be, and that the regime is 
too focused on its own security and survival to realistically contemplate the idea of a large 
scale attack on the South.246  
 
4.3 Conflicting Ideas – Unification Policies 
In principle, both governments on the peninsula promote some sort of future unification of 
the Korean nation in the near future. Intensities varied over time, and so does the idea of 
how such unification should be brought about, but nevertheless does the paradigm of 
unification permeate all aspects of political life on both sides. Both the constitution of the 
DPRK and ROK provide for a unified Korea as a cornerstone of the very self-concept of 
legitimate governance for each regime respectively.247 After all, the Korean War, fought 
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under the impression of foreign powers’ involvement, was in essence begun as an effort to 
achieve unification, in a climate where both sides were more than willing to forcefully 
extend their rule over the whole peninsula with or without bloc support. 
 
After the war, with the Armistice Agreement concluded, conditions had changed. The great 
powers had had enough of war in Korea, a war which had, despite the many lives lost, 
obviously not brought any visible changes either on the peninsula or within the 
international circumstances of the time, and were in favour of preserving, for the time being, 
the status quo. The South Korean regime under Rhee Syngman strongly rejected such a 
position, pushing for US support in an effort to forcefully unify the country and end the 
question of legitimate government once and for all. 248 Kim Il-sung on the other hand, 
obviously understanding the international climate at the time, formulated a different 
approach, calling for economic recuperation and development instead of continuation of 
hostilities. The paradigm of ‘peaceful unification’ would therefore allow the North to 
solidify its social system and strengthen its position vis-à-vis other actors, while playing to 
international realities at the time. 249 Needless to say such a proposal, including a call for 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, would have provided the North with an 
opportunity to rehabilitate its forces and, once the United States had presumably 
unequivocally left, to persuade the USSR or China to support a renewed effort at complete 
unification, a scenario which already had repeatedly led the South to make compromises on 
its radical stance to ensure continued US commitment.250 
 
While the two sides have since then repeatedly approached each other, with mixed results, 
and have both subscribed to a formula of peaceful unification, problems continue to persist. 
One of the most persistent obstacles remains the issue of the legitimate representation of the 
whole of Korea, claimed by both sides simultaneously251, adding a legalistic aspect to the 
already acute political quagmire. After all, the notion of one homogenous Korean people, 
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which both sides maintain exists, in conformity with international law practice252, entails 
the legal question of succession of state, meaning which government can legally claim to 
have succeeded the Korean Empire as the representative of the Korean people.253 As Nam 
Ki-Whan points out, given the long history of the Korean people on the territory of the 
Korean state, it is questionable whether a few decades of de facto separation, which has not 
been legitimized but rather seems to be rejected by a majority of said Korean people, can 
suffice to legitimize the development of two distinct states.254 
 
Over the years since the war, the two sides have attempted to accommodate these 
circumstances by promoting distinct models for reunification, both characterized by the 
emphasis on peaceful means to overcome the separation and the notion that this would have 
to be resolved as an internal Korean issue, and both clearly, though not necessarily directly, 
favouring the prevalence of one of the two sides’ distinctive socio-political systems 
respectively. As early as 1960 the DPRK first proposed the establishment of a form of 
common government, termed the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea to describe its 
federalistic255 character, allowing for co-existence of both systems for as long as needed to 
eventually achieve full unification. In this sense, though the Confederal Republic was 
intended as the primary aim in terms of unification, it effectively represented only a 
transitional phase on the way to full unification under a single government.256 The model 
itself provided for the establishment of a unified government representing both sides and a 
Supreme National Confederal Assembly bringing together, on an equal basis, delegates 
from both sides and overseas Koreans. However, these developments, while representing 
national unification and taking over national policies such as international representation 
and defence, were not to contradict the continuation of either side’s socio-political system, 
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which the local (North and South) governments could pursue at their own discretion. 
Notwithstanding that there are reasons to suspect that the North indeed proposed the 
confederation as a strategic step to eventually unify the peninsula on its terms, such as the 
continued promotion of revolutionary ambitions 257, the Confederal Republic marked a 
definitive movement by the North towards the recognition of two co-existing systems, as 
opposed to the South which at the time promoted the cessation of the North’s socialist 
system and its integration into the ROK as precondition in achieving any form of 
unification.258 Over the years, positions remained steadfastly opposed, with only certain 
changes in attitude such as North Korea’s insistence on the South’s abolition of what it 
termed ‘fascist’ laws as precondition for negotiations at times of greater political tensions 
especially over the treatment of the leftist opposition in the South, leading Gavan 
McCormack to note that “in the long run, of course, what [the South] asks – the disavowal 
of communism – is almost precisely equivalent to what the North asks, only the North 
presents its demands as preconditions to negotiation, while the South presents its as 
objectives to be reached through negotiations.”259  
 
What all these observations show is the difficulty which the two sides faced over the entire 
span of their partition in finding ways to even start engaging each other, which, as tragic as 
it may be, is ironic given that both sides’ pronounced aim was the unification of the 
peninsula. Only later did both sides, while still upholding the principle of peaceful 
unification, start showing signs of mutual consideration as substantial partners for dialogue, 
including a careful recognition of their separate political identities.260 This approach lay at 
the heart of the ROK’s 1989 proposal of a unification formula termed National 
Commonwealth Unification, which suggested the promotion of reconciliation through 
cooperation, providing for a peaceful development and co-prosperity on the peninsula, 
which, though eventually conducive to unification under a single government and system, 
would be held more important than the its long-term goal.261  
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The North however maintained its idea of a confederation to preserve the distinct state 
systems even as unification progresses, which was by then criticised by some observers as 
unrealistic, given its paradox legalistic approach by aiming to prevent the international 
recognition – i.e. its presumably irrevocable institutionalization – of the partition through 
establishment of a confederation which, to these observers, would by itself imply the 
existence of two separate Korean states.262 
 
After the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, South Koreans turned to Germany to 
see the Berlin wall fall and a nation, long divided, united again in peace. In the years to 
follow, many an observer, from the South and abroad, contemplated the possibility of a 
similar development on the peninsula, and while South Koreans went to great length to 
study and learn about the German experience, the South Korean unification policy was 
equally influenced by it.263 However, after the years of initial enthusiasm, and with the 
benefit of hindsight on the social developments in post-unification Germany, commentators 
take a more ambivalent approach to the issue, coming to novel conclusions not only about 
whether a German-style unification would be comparable when transferred to the Korean 
peninsula, but indeed whether or not that kind of unification is at all a desirable scenario.264 
 
Most such arguments assess the situation from an economic point of view.  While many 
agree that unification would necessarily lead to overall economic advantages in the long run, 
the German experience has shown the massive short and medium-term costs which would 
have to be borne by South in case of a quick unification as was the case in Germany.265 
Many experts examining the applicability of the German case to Korea therefore argue that 
once unification was taking place, the ROK would do better not to fully emulate the 
German example of coping with it, especially the speed at which the West German 
government at the time pulled down all barriers, physical as well as economic ones.266 
However, others see the issue even more problematic. They argue that the gap separating 
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the DPRK and the ROK in both economic and socio-political terms has by now grown way 
beyond the difference between the GDR and the FRG at the time, rendering the German 
experience only marginally useful for planning the Korean unification despite other factors 
which would suggest significant parallels between the two cases.267 In addition, the smaller 
population gap between North and South as well as South Korea’s weaker economic 
standing as compared to unification-time West Germany raise the question whether 
German-style unification would be feasible on the peninsula. 268  Apart from economic 
differences, some observers point to today’s significantly different international 
constellation, arguing that while in the German case the US took a strong position in 
Europe as the Soviet Union needed to pull out, the situation in today’s East Asia seems 
diametrically opposed, with China taking an assertive stance while the US show a tendency 
to withdraw their commitment from palaces such as Korea. Plus, in today’s East Asia there 
does not seems to be no such international drive for change towards democracy as was 
prevalent in Eastern Europe of the time.269 
 
Overall, the conclusions reached by these experts show that the South Korean government 
would do well to study the case of German unification, especially its effects and the lessons 
that can be learnt. They will have to ask themselves the question whether the German 
model is at all a scenario to be sought by the South. Twenty years after Germany was 
unified, the sentiment among the population is ambivalent, with a majority of East Germans 
reportedly defending their former country against criticism, while economic development in 
the East still lacking behind the West270. Studies show that while income equality has been 
achieved for those leaving the former East for the West, those that stayed in their home 
places still significantly lack behind their fellow countrymen as far as income is 
concerned271, an issue of particular importance given comparable predictions for a Korean 
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scenario 272  and contemplations in the South to primarily prevent Northerners from 
uncontrollably migrating to the South until the income gap has been significantly closed.273 
However, all these aspects of South Korean deliberations on unification are superseded by 
the one question of whether or not the ROK government will actually have the chance to 
decide on the process of unification when faced with popular sentiments for quick change. 
If Southern leaders indeed contemplate such scenarios of unification under the South, they 
would do well to plan for such contingencies. 
 
In the meantime, inter-Korean relations seem to have taken on at least one aspect of inter-
German relations, that being the ‘Special Relation’ governing their interaction.274 In 1991, 
both the DPRK and the ROK were separately admitted to membership in the UN.275 This 
had been preceded by efforts by the DPRK to convince the South to seek UN membership 
not as separate entities but as one Korean nation, either through utilization of the confederal 
formula276 or through sharing the seat in rotation.277 In the face of a dramatic adjustment of 
South Korea’s foreign policy towards communist countries and the ensuing improvement 
of relations with China and the Soviet Union, the DPRK saw it necessary to equally reach 
out to the international community to avoid possible isolation. On 29 May 1991, the New 
York Times cited a statement of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK issued on that day as 
saying, “as the South Korean authorities insist on their unilateral U.N. membership, if we 
leave this alone important issues related to the interests of the entire Korean nation would 
be dealt with in a biased manner on the U.N. rostrum. … We cannot let it go that way.”278 
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In June 2000, President of the ROK Kim Dae-jung and paramount leader of the DPRK, 
Kim Jong-il, in an unprecedented move of mutual recognition, met in Pyongyang for a 
historic meeting marking the first time that the highest representatives from both sides met 
face-to-face since the partition. Among other things, they signed a five point agreement 
which provided for further rapprochement on the issue of unification, acknowledging each 
other’s position as basis for future cooperation.279 Article 2 of the agreement read, “The 
north and the south, recognizing that a proposal for federation of lower stage advanced by 
the north side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the south side for the 
unification of the country have elements in common, agreed to work for the reunification in 
this direction in the future.” 280  Both Kim Dae-jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun 
pursued what was to be known as the ‘Sunshine Policy’, which promoted engagement with 
the North – including nonreciprocal economic aid valuing billions of US Dollars281 – on the 
assumptions that on the one hand, continued confrontation was both dangerous and 
incapable of changing North Korea’s behaviour, while on the other hand economic 
engagement would lead to reconciliation and cooperation, persuading Pyongyang to change 
its confrontationist policies.282 
 
More than a decade has passed since the 2000 Pyongyang meeting, and discussions on 
unification between the sides seem not to have progressed far since then. Inter-Korean 
relations have climbed new highs and plunged to lows repeatedly, spanning all kinds of 
events from the joint entrance to the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games283, to the DPRK’s 2006 
nuclear test284 followed by the second senior-level summit in Pyongyang285, to the DPRK’s 
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second nuclear test286 and an eventual low following the outbreak of hostilities over the 
NLL around Yeonpyeongdo.287 While some see the future of inter-Korean relations in a 
long-term rapprochement of the two systems based on North Korea’s implementation of 
economic reforms most likely based on China’s example288, others suggest that the DPRK 
will continue uphold its strategy which it has followed resiliently over the last twenty years, 
braving economic hardships through continuously channelling resources to the cornerstones 
of the system and rejecting foreign efforts to restrain weapons programmes it sees as 
indispensable to its security requirements. 289 Again others observe the growing role of 
multilateralist institutions such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO) in approximating the two sides’ positions on a functional level, to which the 
political dimension might follow. 290 Another, most drastic scenario expects the sudden 
collapse amid food shortages and domestic infighting of either the DPRK as a state or the 
currently ruling regime as government, both entailing severe immediate implications for 
inter-Korean relations and the terms of unification.291  
 
While all these scenarios are worthy of further deliberation, observations on the 
development of the two Korea’s claims of legitimacy and the different ideas on unification 
closely connected to it do not reveal any evidence as to where inter-Korean relations might 
be headed. It does show however the volatility of these relations, and especially the up and 
down since the 2000 summit goes to show how easily an issue such as the NLL, as much as 
it may be influenced by the overall situation, can change the whole outset of relations and 
prospects for unification of the peninsula. 
 
4.4 Stabilizing factors – the economy 
The history of volatility in inter-Korean relations inevitably raises the question which 
factors and events drive these seemingly constant movements from cooperative climate to 
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hostilities and back. While in the first case, as above argumentation shows, elements such 
as North Korea’s at times provocative military actions and the South’s abrupt suspension of 
engagement pursued under the Sunshine Policy have regularly plunged relations to the 
lower regions of the spectrum, the factors bringing them back above a limit of sustainable 
cooperation have not yet been sufficiently discussed. 
 
A possible explanation is to be found in neo-realist security thinking on both sides, such as 
the – as discussed at an earlier point – possibility to interpret the South’s promotion of 
Sunshine Policy as a means to increase its own security by decreasing the North’s potential 
threat, or as a matter of fact the notion of the DPRK showing moderate behaviour to secure 
its security situation by decreasing tensions at times when it considers this no longer 
possible through military threat, for example when it considers US military engagement 
likely. However, given that it seems to be the most constant positive element in inter-Korea 
relations, it is worthwhile to consider economic cooperation as a major moderating factor. 
 
When considering economic cooperation on the peninsula in its political ramification, it is 
important to note that development in this field has largely been driven by the North 
Korean economy. While of course both Koreas’ economies are involved in inter-Korean 
trade and economic cooperation, and the South’s economy is presently much more vibrant 
than its Northern counterpart, it is the North’s relative isolation, in political as in economic 
terms, which renders Southern cooperation an economic asset in the eyes of the North. The 
ROK, on the other hand, with its far more diversified trading arrangements, stand to benefit 
from economic cooperation more in a political than in an economic sense, given the 
aforementioned deliberation that economic integration would lead to reform and long-term 
rapprochement of the two systems, eventually enabling unification. This view held by the 
South Korean leadership is most visible in the fact that even after turning its back on its 
predecessors’ Sunshine Policy, the Lee Myung-bak administration upheld the idea of 
economically engaging the North, though with the difference to emphasize the aspect of 
conditionality. 292  This leads to two basic assumptions when examining North-South 
economic cooperation, being that on the one hand, such trade and other forms of economic 
cooperation are conducted on a heavily unbalanced basis. Inter-Korean cooperation is much 
                                                 
292 Bluth, Christoph (2011): Crisis on the Korean peninsula. Potomac Books, Washington D.C. p102 
  - 65 - 
more beneficial to the North’s economy, both in absolute and relative terms.293 The other 
assumption is that economic cooperation on the peninsula is a heavily politicised issue, 
especially when it comes to publicised showpiece projects such as the joint Kaesong 
Industrial Complex.  
 
The gap separating the two sides’ approaches to foreign trade had begun to open at the very 
beginning of partition and consolidation of the respective socio-economic models. The 
communist North adopted an inward-oriented socialist economy based on import 
substitution policies focused on heavy industry, while the South reached out to integrate 
into the international trade system, focusing on light industry for export purposes. This 
corresponded to the already discussed traditional Korean notion of the industrial north and 
agricultural south. While the North lay ahead for the first two decades of development, the 
South’s economy surged due to export growth in the 1960s, and the North, which had 
intensified its inward-looking policies after the initial successes and in response to the 
emerging Sino-Soviet split, began to suffer from its trade imbalance caused by the focus on 
heavy industry and neglect of consumer goods industries. Amongst other factors, decrease 
in assistance from China and the USSR further slowed the North’s economy, resulting in 
the South surpassing it in the early 1970s. In 1974 the DPRK defaulted on debts it had 
incurred in preceding years, increasing its economic isolation and practically cutting it of 
from Western technology.294 From that point on the gap was to widen until the South in the 
1990s achieved full dominance over its neighbour’s declining economy, which suffered all 
the more from the end of Soviet assistance.295 Consequences of the economic downturn not 
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only negatively influenced further economic development but also crippled central aspects 
of public life, such as food and energy security.296 
 
Although the North’s leadership attempted to counter such developments from the early 
1980s on by the introduction of Joint Ventures to its legal system, it was not until the end of 
that decade that inter-Korean economic cooperation was officially agreed upon by the two 
sides, and only after the 2000 inter-Korean summit did substantial growth in investment in 
the North take place. A number of agreements entered in the wake of the 2000 summit 
allowed for institutionalization of trade relations, providing increased security and 
incentives for South Korean investments.297 Favourable conditions were not limited to trade 
legislation when, in the political climate of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s Sunshine 
Policy, South Korean private companies, supported by the South Korean government, 
reached out to the North to develop large infrastructure projects, most prominently the Mt. 
Geumgang tourist resort and the Kaesong Industrial Complex.298  
 
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, these projects supported growing 
economic development and integration between the two sides. Especially the Kaesong 
complex, located just north of the DMZ, became a symbol for beginning economic 
integration on the peninsula.299 These showcase examples are especially interesting as their 
economic significance is quite unclear. While some suggest that the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex provides a valuable business opportunity for South Korean businesses, providing 
a viable alternative to outsourcing to other countries like China or Vietnam due to a 
combination of low labour costs and tax benefits300, others contend that due to considerably 
lower productivity compared to other production sites, most companies investing in 
Kaesong are in fact losing money.301 Equally, Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company 
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who had developed and was running the Mt. Geumgang resort, reported heavy losses and 
consequently received financial support from the government.302 Considering that the ROK 
government is obviously not promoting the joint projects for their short-term economic 
profitability, and that long-term profitability would probably largely depend on a 
favourable development of inter-Korean relations, it can be inferred that the government 
supports these projects for their political value, including the possible deliberation that 
providing 50,000 North Koreans with a well-paid job could be a first, albeit small step to 
decreasing the income gap between North and South. 
 
Motives of the DPRK government are more ambiguous. It is generally assumed that their 
main reason for continuously lending their support to the projects is that in the face of 
diminishing aids and widespread economic isolation, the projects are among the last 
remaining sources of foreign currency for the North, especially considering that wages paid 
to North Korean workers by the South Korean companies are first transmitted to the 
North’s government, which distributes them after deducting a certain amount in fees. All in 
all, it is estimated that the DPRK government collects US$ 2 million each month through 
the Kaesong complex alone, while a report by Hyundai suggested that if the complex was 
fully developed and operating at full capacity, North Korea could incur up to US$9.55 
billion over the course of nine years.303 Other views exist though which suggest that more 
than short-term revenue, it is long-term economic development and stimulation to the 
domestic economy which the North sees as the main benefit of the projects. 
 
Of course, economic cooperation is not immune to the volatility of inter-Korean relations. 
The Mt. Geumgang resort actually turned into a hotspot of tensions in its own right when in 
July 2008 a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean soldier when she had 
reportedly entered a fenced off military area. In the aftermath, economic cooperation in 
general suffered, and the resort had to be closed as South Korea prohibited its citizens from 
travelling there.304 The situation has not yet been resolved and any contacts regarding the 
issue are highly tensed. As of 2011, North Korea seems to be attempting to find foreign 
investors for the resort, following an announcement that it would evict any remaining South 
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Korean employees and sell off the assets, in case of which South Korea has threatened 
sanctions.305 
 
In general, however, showcase projects of economic cooperation, especially the Kaesong 
complex, have been relatively unharmed by the fluctuations in North-South relationships 
over the years. Even when in 2010 the ROK government suspended all contacts with the 
North in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, the Kaesong complex remained open, along 
with an exception for the continuation humanitarian aid for infants and children. The South 
did however announce to stop further investing in the complex, and threatened to 
commence the broadcasting of propaganda messages over the MDL. As a reaction the 
DPRK government in turn threatened to shut down the Kaesong complex, but it remained 
open. 306  These events are indeed descriptive for the strange position which economic 
cooperation takes in inter-Korean relations. While they are largely considered as means to 
promote rapprochement of the two sides’ socio-economic systems and unification, which 
predestines them as a pawn in the efforts to elicit concessions from the other side, they are 
at the same time an end in themselves, one which neither side seems to be willing to 
seriously risk. 
 
4.5 The wider setting – international actors’ approach to Korea 
Another important factor with regards to inter-Korean relations and developments on the 
peninsula at large is the involvement of international actors. As discussed in the preceding 
chapters, Korea has traditionally been the object of foreign powers’ interests which thus 
throughout its history attempted to influence conditions and events on the peninsula. 
Especially throughout its modern history, conditions for Korea have been largely dictated 
by such foreign powers, from Japanese occupation to partition under Soviet and American 
forces to its role as a borderline of the great international political rift during the Cold War. 
Today, Korea has to cope with the results of these processes, having to overcome a division 
along the very centre of the peninsula, marked by fences and barbed wire but even more 
dramatically marked by the stark difference between two different socio-economic models 
causing friction and tension as they interact. In today’s world of long-distance weapons 
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which enable a relatively small nation to pose a disproportionate threat and of globally 
pursued security and economic interests, regional powers have ever more reason to 
influence the course of events according to their interests. While both Koreas stress the 
need for them to solve their differences alone307, they both continue to rely on outside 
actors to protect their security and economic wellbeing.  
 
For the ROK, this role has traditionally been taken by the US, which continues to be the 
South’s most important partner in security cooperation. After relations were somewhat 
strained at the beginning of the century as a consequence of Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Sunshine 
Policy’ and its obvious inability to constrain Pyongyang’s quest for nuclear weapons308, 
which in American eyes brought the South too close to its Northern neighbour, tensions 
have lessened as the South grows concerned about its ability to defend itself against the 
North’s aggression should the US turn their back on the peninsula.309 Following the more 
engaging approach of the Clinton administration, the Bush administration somewhat turned 
US strategy around, famously labelling North Korea as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and 
promoting its isolation.310 In 2005 the Presidents of US and ROK agreed that the key to 
removing the North Korean security threat was inter-Korean reconciliation and peaceful 
unification311, even though some observers suggest that the US in the long run peaceful 
unification could result in a unified Korea much closer to the growing power China than to 
the US.312 This is in turn expected could lead to the establishment of two power blocs, a 
Chinese-led one on the mainland and the US-Japan alliance in the Pacific.313 The drive for 
isolation and containment of North Korea is equally valid for Japan314, which sees itself 
threatened both existentially by the DPRK’s missile development and nuclear programme 
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and politically as the North attempts to capitalize on differences in threat perceptions to 
undermine the traditional post-World War Japan-US alliance.315 Closer relations between 
Japan and South Korea are likely to stumble over the past, as Koreans deeply resent the era 
of Japanese colonialism, a feeling only strengthened by Japan’s refusal to issue an earnest 
apology and its at times revisionist view of history. 316  While Japan would prefer the 
continuation of the status quo with a partitioned, albeit denuclearized peninsula, to a unified 
Korea with close ties to China317, a common denominator of anti-Japanese feeling as a 
consequence of its historical role is contributing to bringing the two Koreas, as well as 
other Asian nations, closer to each other.318  
 
A third actor with strong strategic interests in the region is the Russian Federation. 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation quickly 
exchanged its predecessor’s political stakes in the peninsula with economic ones by a 
drastic revaluation of relationship with the ROK.319 Under Boris Yeltsin Russia basically 
ignored Pyongyang, whereas the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000 led to a renewed 
rapprochement between the two countries.320 As a consequence of its mainly economic 
interests, Russia seems to hope for a unified Korea undecided whether to lean to China or 
the US as a chance for it to extend its influence as laughing third, leading to the slightly 
ironic notion of Russia actually preferring US troops to remain on the peninsula, keeping 
Chinese influence at bay.321 Some success in this strategy could be observed in late 2011 
when after a visit of Kim Jong-il to Russia plans for an oil pipeline connecting the Russian 
Far East to South Korea, running over North Korean soil, surfaced, soliciting at least initial 
support from both Koreas under a Russian policy initiative.322 
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Chances are high that China’s emerging power will in near the future be the most 
influential factor with regards to international involvement and integration of the peninsula. 
This assumption is based on the quite simple logic that China is presently the only country 
wielding political influence in Pyongyang323 while at the same time exerting economic 
influence in the South.324 In the short term, China is pursuing two major policy goals with 
regards to the peninsula. On the one hand, it needs to consider avoiding the sudden collapse 
of North Korea a top priority, given that such a development is anticipated to trigger mass 
emigration of North Koreans into China, a scenario which was already observed, albeit on a 
smaller scale, during the 1990s famine.325 Avoiding sudden collapse must be seen as one of 
the reasons for China to tentatively strengthen Pyongyang’s back in the face of pressure. 
On the other hand China would prefer to see the peninsula remain nuclear weapons-free, as 
it fears North Korean successful acquisition of nuclear capabilities might trigger an arms 
race – nuclear or conventional – across the region, involving South Korea, Japan, and in the 
worst case Taiwan.326 In general, China seems to the continuation of the status quo, with a 
relatively stable – economically supported by China – but non-nuclear North as buffer zone 
against US troops in South Korea, and a strong trading partner in the South,327 though as 
China’s growing influence on both Korea’s makes a unified Korea more likely to lean 
towards China than the US, Beijing could eventually encourage unification processes. 
Other views exist, however, within the Beijing’s policy making circles, which represent a 
traditionalist approach focused not only on North Korea as a strategic asset against US 
encroachment in Asia, but also on reflection of China’s past relationship with the DPRK as 
                                                                                                                                                     
the high tensions governing relations in the wake of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongdo incidents a year earlier. 
Stangarone, Troy (2011): “Russia’s North Korea Gas Deal”, The Diplomat Blogs, on http://the-
diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/11/15/russias-north-korea-gas-deal/, 27.12.2011 
323  New York Times (2011): “China Exerts Influence Nurtured Over Decades”, on 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/asia/china-moves-to-ensure-stability-in-north-
korea.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=north%20korea&st=cse, 21.12.2011 
324 China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, and Chinese policy makers have long called for a Free 
Trade Agreement to deepen economic ties between the two countries, negotiations on which are expected to 
commence within 2012. Zhou, Shengqi (2010): “Sino-South Korean Trade Relations: from Boom to 
Recession” (=National University of Singapore East Asian Institute Background Brief No. 508), on 
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB598.pdf, 04.12.2011 p14. See also The China Post (2012): “China, South Korea 
to negotiate toward FTA: communique”, The China Post Online, on 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/china/business/2012/01/12/328736/China-South.htm, 14.01.2012 
325 International Crisis Group (2010): “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea” (=Crisis Group 
Asia Report No. 198) p17 
326 Ibid. pp18, 20 
327 Coghlan, David (2008): Prospects from Korean Unification. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle pp13-14 
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they fought side by side “to resist America”328.329 This is a good example to show that 
indeed, though representing strong preferences, none of the policy goals described above 
can be seen as given, and that they might be influenced as easily by other actors’ policies as 
by other elements of inter-Korean relations, such as the ones described in this chapter. 
 
As the framework of the UN, as related to the Korean case, is mainly utilised by the 
international community to condemn the DPRK and impose sanctions in response to what it 
considers armed provocation, different frameworks for engaging the North had to be found, 
leading to the inception in 2003 of the Six Party Talks which have recently been mainly 
promoted by China, which sees them as a way to keep nuclear weapons off the peninsula 
while at the same time keeping Pyongyang in the picture and upholding the status quo.330 
As the UNSC negotiations on the sanctions regime against North Korea, the Six Party 
Talks are marked by hard-line position on behalf of the US, while China and Russia attempt 
to exert a moderating influence to any degree possible.331 
 
Given the growing importance of regional economic integration in determining 
international relations between East Asian nations, including in the case of Korea, regional 
frameworks will be needed to translate that economic momentum into increased political 
cooperation. While some observers had hoped for the Six Party Talks to develop into such a 
regional forum332, their actual record could not yet fulfil such expectations as the nuclear 
issue persists amidst mainly US-North Korean disagreement over when to remove the 
sanctions regime. 333  As mentioned before, some see KEDO or a similar functional 
cooperation mechanism as the future of international dialogue on the peninsula. 
 
As can be seen, inter-Korean relations are influenced by a variety of aspects, including 
security concerns, complications due to the relatively unclear legal status of the two sides, 
                                                 
328 In China’s official terminology the historical account of the Korean War is referred to as “The History of 
the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea”. Rawnsley, Gary D. (2009): 
“’The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’: how Beijing sold the Korean War”, in Media, 
War & Conflict 2, No. 3 (December 2009) pp289-290 
329 International Crisis Group (2010): “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea” (=Crisis Group 
Asia Report No. 198) p7 
330 Kim, Joungwon Alexander/Hong, Myungshin (2006): “The Koreas, Unification, and the Great Powers”, in 
Current History 105 (April 2006) p189 
331  Kwak, Tae-Hwan/Joo, Seung-Ho (2009): North Korea’s foreign policy under Kim Jong Il: new 
perspectives. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Farnham p208 
332 Kim, Joungwon Alexander/Hong, Myungshin (2006): “The Koreas, Unification, and the Great Powers”, in 
Current History 105 (April 2006) p187 
333  Snyder, Scott/Cossa, Ralph A./Glosserman, Brad (2006): “Whither the Six-Party Talks?”, on 
http://www.stratad.net/downloads/May%2018.pdf, 04.12.2011 
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economic cooperation and international involvement. While it may not be possible to 
explain all developments concerning the two Koreas through observation of these elements, 
the notion that they are profoundly interconnected can go a long way in helping to 
understand the often rigorous changes of conditions on the peninsula. 
 
 
5. The NLL within the wider scope of inter-Korean relations  
If anything, the analysis of the main aspects of today’s status quo of relations on and 
around the peninsula has revealed the inherent mutual interconnectedness of different 
aspects and indeed of different dimensions of interaction. In order to fully grasp the scope 
of interconnectedness between the NLL dispute and the wider arrangements on the 
peninsula, it is necessary to analyse it on similar terms reflecting the elements shaping the 
developments in today’s Korea as a whole. In doing so it is not only possible to describe the 
degree to which the NLL dispute is influenced by developments taking place on the wider 
Korean level, but also discern elements which drive the maritime border conflict in its own 
right and thereby contribute to that wider dimension. 
 
5.1 The MDL of the sea – naval forces on the NLL 
As on the MDL, the demarcation line separating the two Koreas on land, partition and 
decade-long anticipation of conflict has led both sides to build up considerable forces 
strategically placed along their coastlines. As was discussed in the previous chapters, one of 
the main lessons the countries took away from the Korean War was, given Korea’s 
geographic nature as long-stretched body of land surrounded by water, the importance of 
the seas in transporting troops and supplies to any point on the peninsula. However, given 
the rise of prominence of the NLL area in inter-Korean tensions, other utilization than 
traditional combat support, such as effective patrolling of maritime territory, have risen in 
importance, and the importance of both side’s navies seem to be accorded special attention 
by the respective leaderships.334 
                                                 
334 As far as the North is concerned this is indicated, amongst others, by rapid rise in rank and political 
importance in the early 2000s of General Kim Yun Sim who had, as Commander of the Navy, been in control 
over the DPRK naval units during the 1999 and 2002 clashes in the West Sea, and the increasingly publicised 
apparent interest the late paramount leader Kim Jong-il took in the navy. Gause, Ken E. (2006): North Korean 
Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle p38. With regards 
to the ROK, rising attention to the Navy by Seoul can be inferred from the prominence the naval forces take 
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Reflecting the overall balance between the armed forces of both sides, the comparison of 
the two navies shows an advantage of the North over the South in terms of numbers of 
tactical vessels such as landing craft and coastal submarines. 
 
Fig 1. Comparison of DPRK and ROK naval forces by number:335 
Type DPRK ROK 
Aircraft 0 5 
Amphibious vessels 10 172 
Corvettes 5 26 
Cruisers 0 1 
Destroyers 0 6 
Frigates 3 12 
Helicopters 0 29 
Landing Craft 257 31 
Mine Warfare 
(Counter) 24 9 
Mine Warfare 
(Layer) 0 1 
Patrol and Coastal 
Combatants 378 145 
Submarines 70 23 
Tank 0 100 
Manpower 60,000 68,000 
 
As with the forces of other military sectors, the numerical advantage is however limited to 
certain, mostly light categories of vessels, and in general largely offset by the progressed 
age of material and the lack of modern electronic equipment such as fire control systems.336 
Given the widespread suspicion as to the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan of a North 
Korean torpedo fired from a coastal submarine being involved, the North’s advantage in 
submarines is especially noteworthy. Different estimates on their number exist, with some 
                                                                                                                                                     
in the South’s efforts to modernize its armed forces, especially in the aftermath of what was publicly received 
as a failed response to the Cheonan incident and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo. Ministry of National Defense 
(2010): 2010 Defense White Paper. p53 
335 Numbers based on Cordesman, Anthony H. (2011): The Korean Military Balance. Comparative Korean 
Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington 
D.C. pp33-36 
336 Moon, Chung-in/Lee Sangkeun (2009): “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula”, 
in Asian Perspective 33, No. 4 (2009) p85 
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sources pointing to up to a hundred submarines in service in the early 2000s337, though 
exact numbers based on official information are not easily, if at all, available.338 In addition, 
it is assumed that only a certain number of them may be ready for active service duty at any 
given time, making it even harder to estimate their possible deployment. However, it is 
widely accepted that the submarines – mostly small coastal and infiltration submarines – 
enable the North to perform a number of activities including, in addition the sinking of 
enemy ships, the laying of mines and the undetected transport and insertion of Special 
Forces behind enemy lines 339, thereby playing an important role in the North’s likely 
strategy to open another front in the South’s hinterland should open war break out. 
 
In any case, besides their readiness for involvement should wider conflict break out, both 
the DPRK and the ROK navies serve in a more limited manner as measures to protect their 
respective side’s claims to territorial waters, as is the case in the Yellow Sea area around 
the NLL, including the assertion of fishing rights in such areas. A number of incidents in 
the Yellow Sea, especially at the time before the NLL seemingly became a matter of 
principle connected to the wider range of tensions between the two Koreas, were brought 
about by military vessels crossing the line to escort friendly or chase out other fishing 
vessels340, raising the question of its economic significance to both North and South Korea. 
 
5.2 Economic significance of the NLL 
Fishery has long been an important factor in governing relations in the Yellow Sea, and 
East Asia in general. A 2000 report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) noted that the East Asian sub-region was “one of the world’s greatest fish 
producing areas. The East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan and the eastern 
offshore waters of Japan are among the most heavily exploited waters in the world.”341 The 
                                                 
337  Toppan, Andrew (2001): “World Navies Today: North Korea”, on 
www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/n_korea.htm, 04.12.2011 
338 Cordesman, Anthony H. (2011): The Korean Military Balance. Comparative Korean Forces and the 
Forces of Key Neighboring States. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C. pX 
339 Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr. (2009): “Understanding the North Korean Military Threat to the Security of the 
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p134 
340 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) 
341 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2000): Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to 
Food Security. FAO Report p3. See also Park, Seong-Kwae/Lee, Dong-Woo (2009): “Assessment of 
effectiveness of improved fisheries management techniques”, in Korea Maritime Institute International 
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domestic availability of such resources is especially important to a country like North 
Korea, which has been hit by famine in the past and which still has problems to provide 
food security for its entire population.342 Currently, 4.9 per cent of the relatively low per 
capita amount of protein consumed in the DPRK is accounted for by fish.343 Similarly, fish 
is an important component of nutrition in South Korea, accounting for a much higher 
percentage of the country’s protein consumption than in the North.344 While stagnating 
levels of domestic fish production, making increased imports necessary, and a growing 
diversity in other foodstuffs have in recent years reduced the prevalence of fish in South 
Koreans’ diet, it still remains high and in 2007 the ROK was ranked eighth among the 
world’s top fish-consuming countries.345 
 
That said, it is clear that control over maritime resources is of utmost importance for both 
sides in terms of food security. However, setting the idea of securing these food resources 
as a matter of principle and precedent aside, this can hardly suffice to explain a decade-long 
stand-off over a relatively narrow corridor of water.346 The answer lies in the fact that 
North Korea does not only catch fish for domestic consumption, but has over the year 
established a significant source of income by exporting certain maritime species to other 
countries, in particular China and Japan. Terence Roehrig maintains that in 2001, the 
DPRK exported US$7.8 million worth of crabs, bringing much needed foreign currency to 
the cash-strapped North.347 Of particular importance for fishery in the area are ocellate spot 
skate, butterfish and blue crab, the latter of which tend to migrate through the area in high 
numbers every spring, causing fishing vessels to follow them as they move around the area 
                                                 
342  The United Nations World Food Programme states that “current rations provided by the DPRK 
government can meet well les than half of the daily calorific needs for the 68% of the 16 million population 
receiving public food rations through the [public distribution system].” World Food Programme: “Korea, 
Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK)”, on http://www.wfp.org/countries/Korea--Democratic-People-s-
Republic--DPRK-/Overview, 04.12.2004 
343 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010): 1961-2007. Fish and Fishery Products. 
World Apparent Consumption Statistics Based on Food Balance Sheets. FAO Report p19 
344 Ibid. p19 
345 Ibid. p39 
346 North Korean claims would shift the NLL further to the South, based on a 12nm territorial sea instead of 
the presently roughly 3nm. While the designation of a new equidistant line would then result in a significant 
absolute area of sea falling under the North’s control, that area’s size would still be quite insignificant in 
relation to the North’s overall territorial waters. 
347 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
in Korea Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) p515 
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without regard for manmade demarcation lines.348 The coincidence of the blue crab fishing 
season, from June to September, with many major incidents along the line is indicative of 
the strong connection between the fishery sector and the enforceability of the NLL. While 
the source of additional income to North Korea is probably the most imminent economic 
cause for intrusions over the NLL, South Korean fishermen are equally eager to exploit the 
Yellow Sea’s rich resources. As a consequence of continuous seizures of South Korean 
trawlers by the DPRK navy, the South to eventually in 1964 declared the so called Fishing 
Limit Line, aimed at restraining South Korean civilian vessels from approaching – or, as 
the DPRK would argue, entering – Northern waters. The line – established in both the 
Yellow and the East Sea – which was adjusted several times over the years in coherence 
with the rise and fall of tensions on the peninsula, moving either towards or away from the 
NLL, seems to have been quite effective as seizures of Southern vessels by the North have 
dramatically decreased since the 1960s.349  
 
While fishery is a main economic factor which led to several clashes over the year, the NLL 
has further economic implications. The present location of the line, closely following the 
North Korean coast around the Ongjin peninsula and still further north, is a major obstacle 
to North Korean access to the Yellow Sea and further to international waters. As neither 
side’s civilian ships may cross the NLL, ships travelling between North and South, 
especially on the route between Nampo and Incheon which accounts for over 90% of inter-
Korean cargo trade have to take a detour to avoid the waters delimitated by the NLL, 
resulting in higher shipping costs and in many cases in transhipment over China.350 North 
Korea’s Haeju port facility, tucked in in Haeju bay behind Ongjin peninsula is even more 
isolated, factually being blocked from the Yellow Sea and especially nearby Incheon.351 In 
addition, as the Han River estuary near the NLL and the MDL remains blocked for civilian 
                                                 
348 Ibid. p515. See also Hong, Seong-Geol/Kim, Sun-Pyo/Lee, Hyung-Ki (2001): “Fisheries Cooperation and 
Maritime Delimitation Issues between North Korea and Its Neighboring Countries”, in Ocean Policy 
Research 16, No. 1 (June 2001) p207 
349 Ibid. pp203-205 
350 Olsen, John/Cannoni, Mike/Koelm, Jenny (2003): “Martime Cooperation for the Koreas”, Sandia National 
Laboratories, on http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand2003-1843p.pdf, 04.12.2011. See also Roehrig, 
Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, in Korea 
Observer 39, No. 4 (Winter 2008) pp515-516 
351 Ibid. p516 
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traffic352, the NLL also blocks the Kaesong Industrial Complex from shipping routes to the 
South.353 
 
5.3 International Views 
Given that the international community perceives the NLL as an integral element of overall 
relations on the Korean peninsula at large, their approaches towards incidents along the line 
are largely congruent with their attitude toward other confrontational issues such as the 
North’s nuclear programme. Following any incidents, the US is usually quick to show its 
support for their long-time ally South Korea, condemning the North and emphasizing its 
security commitment to the South, as was the case in the aftermath of the Cheonan 
incident.354 However, as could be observed on the very same occasion when planned joint 
naval exercises were delayed and downscaled, the US seems slightly less willing than 
before to antagonize other regional powers such as China and actually deploy its military 
forces, even if for drill purposes only, to uphold South Korean deterrent potential. 355 
Interestingly, despite its still strong involvement and support for the South in security 
questions with regards to the peninsula, it is relatively muted as to its position on the actual 
issue of the NLL, which might be indicative of a stance that the issue should be solved 
between the two Koreas. 356  Indeed, some observers suggest that while the NLL was 
originally drawn by the US in their capacity of leader of the UNC, it lacks any authority to 
negotiate a final agreement as such authority would only be vested in the ruling 
government. 357 The only indication of official US position on the NLL per se can be 
derived from formerly classified communication between the American embassy in Seoul 
and Washington recently made available, including a 1973 message from the State 
Department to the embassy stating that both State Department and Department of Defense 
had “reservations about [the South Korean Minisitry of Foreign Affair’s] attempt to give 
                                                 
352 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group 
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NLL validity as a ‘respected’ element of ‘armistice regime’ which has developed over past 
20 years. We are aware of no evidence that NLL has ever been officially presented to North 
Koreas. We would be in an extremely vulnerable position of charging them with 
penetrations beyond a line they have never accepted or acknowledged.”358  
 
In keeping with its general strategy to strengthen the DPRK’s back in the face of 
international pressure, China tends to refrain from reprimanding Pyongyang for incidents 
on the NLL, and rather seeks to exert a moderating influence in international fora. South 
Korea was especially alienated by this stance following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong 
incidents, when it had expected China’s strategic priorities to favour its position over the 
North’s, but instead found China to criticise its attempts to internationalize the issue.359 On 
the technical level, China, much like the US remains fairly muted, probably considering the 
NLL an internal Korean issue, while being more concerned about its own maritime 
delimitation with either Korea halfway into the Yellow Sea.360 
 
Japanese and Russian stances towards the NLL dispute, especially regarding any incidents, 
equally tend to reflect their general perceptions and ambitions on the Korean situation in 
general. In the face of North Korean military actions, which it sees as an assertion of threat 
capabilities, Japan is usually quick to emphasize the importance of the strategic US-Japan 
alliance, which probably is a reaction to its already discussed perceptions of the DPRK 
aiming to undermine that relationship. 361  On the NLL demarcation issue in particular, 
however, it can be suspected that Japan will not take a particularly assertive stance, beyond 
its general support for the South and antagonism to the North, given its own history of 
island disputes with the countries in the region, including with Japan over Dokdo – or in 
Japanese terms, Takeshima – in the Sea of Japan.362 Russia, which is – with exception of 
the US, of course – geographically the remotest of all regional powers to access to the 
                                                 
358 US Department of State: “ROKG legal memorandum on northwest coastal incidents”, State Department 
Cable (22 December 1973), on http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=107420&dl=1345, 
04.12.2011 
359 Snyder, Scott/Byun, See-Won (2011): “Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to 
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  - 80 - 
Yellow Sea, seems to mainly see the NLL dispute as a means to promote its strategy for the 
future Korean peninsula, reacting to incidents in the it considers manner most useful in 
keeping the Korean situation stable while aiming to increase its influence and cooperation 
with both sides at the same time. This was very well observable when, following the 
Cheonan incident, Russia supported the North by dispatching a second experts mission 
which reportedly refuted large parts of the findings of the ROK-led mission, while it 
differed from its usual stance in UNSC negotiations after the Yeonpyeongdo shelling 
incident by calling for a quick resolution, aimed at reassuring the South and preventing it 
from staging the joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea.363  
 
6. Legal frameworks for the NLL dispute and its solution 
The NLL presently being a political issue between the two Koreas, the question of its 
compatibility with and justification through international law is at the moment only of 
limited practical importance. While both Koreas do point at certain international 
instruments to underline their claims and positions, both interpret them to their liking in a 
purely political manner.364 Nevertheless, for two reasons the question of a legal solution 
should not be cast aside lightly. On the one hand, it is not impossible that one day the two 
sides will come to an agreement on solving the dispute through true adjudication based on 
international instruments. On the other hand, international legal instruments can be 
important for third countries to define their position vis-à-vis the parties, which may as a 
consequence lead these countries on their part to urge for a legal solution.  
 
Two instruments are of major importance for an analysis of the legal framework of the NLL. 
The first one is the already mentioned 1953 Armistice Agreement, which explicitly 
designates the five islands along the NLL as UNC territory, equivalent to today’s South 
                                                 
363 Snyder, Scott/Byun, See-Won (2011): “Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to 
North Korea’s Provocations”, in RUSI Journal 156, No. 2 (April 2011) p79. See also Lynch, Colum (2010): 
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http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/19/russian_initiative_to_stop_south_korean_military_exercis
e_fails, 04.12.2011 
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Korea. However, the DPRK maintains that the Armistice Agreement does not account for 
the establishment of the NLL, and can therefore not be the legal basis, as contended by the 
South.  
  
The second major instrument is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 after nine years of negotiations. The ROK signed the 
convention and ratified it in 1996, whereas the DPRK is a signatory state but has not yet 
ratified it.365 It offers a legal framework for the solution of disputes regarding maritime 
border delimitations. Nevertheless, its provisions are open to political interpretation as long 
as the parties to a dispute do not agree on binding adjudication along its statutes, as is the 
case in Korea.  
 
However, a number of cases sharing relevant similarities with the current NLL dispute have 
been adjudicated, under the application of the UNCLOS, by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). Analysis of such adjudication shall be the third basis on which the 
deliberations in this chapter rest. 
 
6.1 The NLL and the Armistice Agreement 
There is little doubt that the 1953 Armistice Agreement, signed by UNC Commander-in-
Chief General Mark W. Clark on the one hand, and by Peng Dehuai, Commander of the 
CPV and Kim Il Sung, Marshal of the DPRK on the other hand, laid the ground for the 
ensuing difficulties in the West Sea. As no consent could be attained on the issue of setting 
a maritime demarcation line, as had been decided on land, the parties settled for the more 
general designation of islands which were to be under either side’s control. To this end, 
Armistice Agreement Article IIA, Paragraph 13b stipulates for the Commanders of the 
opposing sides to, 
“Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all 
of their military forces, supplies and equipment form the rear and the coastal islands 
and waters of Korea of the other side. … The term ‘coastal islands’, as used above, 
refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this 
                                                 
365 Notably, the US has neither signed nor ratified the convention. United Nations (2011): “Status of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI 
of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating 
to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Table 
recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements, as at 20 September 2011”, on 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf, 04.12.2011 pp3, 6, 8 
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Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 
1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the 
provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be 
under the military control of the [Korean People’s Army] and the [CPV], except the 
island groups of PAENGYONG-DO …, TAECHONG-DO …, SOCHONG-DO …, 
YONPYONG-DO…, and U-DO …, which shall remain under the military control of 
the [UNC]. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above 
mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military conrol of the [UNC].”366 
 
While this paragraph clearly regulates the control of the Northwest Islands, it remains 
ambiguous as to whether or not the waters surrounding them would be attributed to the 
UNC along with the control over the islands. However, Paragraph 15 under the same article 
states, 
“This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces 
shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of 
Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade 
of any kind of Korea.”367 
 
Paragraph 16 goes on to state, 
“This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall 
respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under 
military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.”368 
 
One could possibly argue that by stipulating for the opposing naval and air forces to respect 
the water contiguous to the area under the opposite side’s control, the above paragraphs 15 
and 16 clarify to a certain extent the phrase waters of Korea of the other side utilized in 
paragraph 13b. To a certain extent, that is, as the two paragraphs themselves remain highly 
ambiguous. While paragraph 15 prescribes to respect the waters contiguous to the land area 
of Korea under the control of the opposing side, paragraph 16 refers to water contiguous to 
the area of Korea under military control. While one could, as already stated, superficially 
argue that these terms define waters of Korea of the other side as any water contiguous to 
                                                 
366 “Agreement between the Commander-in.Chief, United Nations Command, and the Supreme Commander 
of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Concerning a Military 
Armistice in Korea. Signed at Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953”, in International Organization 7, No. 4 
(November 1953) pp614-615 
367 Ibid. p617 
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any area held by one particular side, meaning that this would also include the waters 
surrounding the Northwest Islands, one could with similar ease counter that land area is a 
term clearly differentiated from the previously defined term coastal islands, implying the 
purpose to differentiate the two in meaning with regards to this provision which would 
render it inapplicable to coastal islands as defined in paragraph 13b. Even more confusing, 
the subsequent use of the term area is open to practically any interpretation as to its 
inclusion of what was before termed as coastal islands. 
 
These deliberations are not necessarily helpful in the discerning the connection between the 
Armistice Agreement and the NLL – which probably explains why most commentators find 
it sufficient to note the provisions in paragraph 13b and the fact that no maritime boundary 
was agreed upon 369  – but they are quite useful in understanding that the Armistice 
Agreement was indeed intended as a temporary military instrument only, providing the 
basis for the prevention of a resumption of hostilities, but leaving the more cumbersome 
task of establishing clear rules and norms for a long-term peaceful Korea to future 
negotiations, as provisioned in Article IV, Paragraph 60: 
“In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military 
Commanders of both sides herby recommend to the governments of the countries 
concerned on both sides that … a political conference of a higher level of both sides be 
held … to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”370 
 
The above analysis of the Koran Armistice Agreement as it relates to has brought several 
findings. First, the agreement does not leave any doubt as to whether the Northwest Islands 
should be under control of the South. Second, it does not specify how exactly the waters 
surrounding the peninsula should be partitioned, i.e. it does not designate a maritime 
demarcation line. Third, as a consequence the agreement does not make clear whether or 
not the area surrounding the Northwest Islands were intentionally attributed to UNC control.  
And fourth, it is important to note that the Armistice Agreement was not incepted as a long-
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term settlement, but envisioned subsequent negotiations negotiation to settle issues such as 
a maritime boundary. 
 
The third finding is of particular importance, as it pertains to the very heart of the question 
whether the NLL cuts through water which would normally rightfully attributed to the 
North, or whether it could be argued that the Armistice Agreement provided a basis to 
demarcate waters rightfully under UNC control and territory under the North’s control. If it 
is assumed, however, that the Northwest Islands are rightful territory of the ROK, then, 
regardless of possible but undefined intentions manifested in the Armistice Agreement, 
according to the 1982 UNCLOS these islands should, in principle, imply an extension of 
the territorial sea.371 
 
6.2 The implications of the UNCLOS for the NLL 
In principle, the UNCLOS stipulates every state’s right to establish a territorial sea of a 
breadth of up to 12nm. Article 3 states accordingly: 
“Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with 
this Convention.”372 
 
As mentioned above, Article 121 (2) provides for this principle to be applied for islands as 
much as a State’s mainland: 
“Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea … of an island [is] 
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other 
land territory.”373 
 
However, before continuing, it is important to note that while the UNCLOS stipulates the 
right to a 12nm territorial sea for every state, this does not necessarily mean that every state 
has to insist on such a broad territorial sea. The 12nm are not at all a set value, but rather 
indicate the furthest length to which a state may extend its territorial waters under the 
UNCLOS. As Van Dyke, Valencia and Miller Garmendia point out, there are numerous 
examples of states voluntarily limiting their territorial sea as a whole or in certain areas. 
                                                 
371 UNCLOS Article 121 (2). United Nations (1982): United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN 
Document A/Conf.62/122 
372 UNCLOS Article 3. Ibid. 
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The probably best known example being Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, other cases 
exist where states limit their territorial sea around certain islands only, or at the mouth of a 
gulf to provide otherwise cut off states with access to the high seas.374 States may therefore 
at any time unilaterally decide for themselves how to delimit their territorial sea – within 
the 12nm maximum defined by the UNCLOS – if they, for whatever reason, whish to do so. 
While such a move by either North or South Korea, or indeed on a mutual basis, would be 
the simplest way to diffuse the situation in the Yellow Sea, this is presently highly 
improbable due to the situation in inter-Korean relations and the their interconnectedness 
with the NLL dispute.  
 
However, the UNCLOS provides a framework for the designation of a delimitating line in 
the absence of mutual (or unilateral) agreement between two states the coasts of which are 
adjacent to or facing each other. To this end Article 15 describes the principle of an 
equidistant median line: 
“Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of 
the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is 
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the 
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance herewith “375 
 
Terence Roehrig suggests that the current location of the NLL contradicts this principle.376 
However, the accuracy of this observation depends on the basis – in above Article termed 
baselines – one utilizes to measure that median point from. If the Northwest Islands are 
assumed to be an integral part of South Korea, and the ROK suggests this to be the case, 
then a State – in this case the ROK – might be tempted to see such islands as part of its 
coastline upon which the territorial sea should be based.377 In that sense, the NLL would 
                                                 
374 Van Dyke, Jon M./Valencia, Mark J./Miller Garmendia, Jenny (2003): “The North/South Korea Boundary 
Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea”, in Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (March 2003) pp153-154 
375 UNCLOS Article 15. United Nations (1982): United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN 
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376 Roehrig, Terence (2008): “The Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Towards a Negotiated Settlement”, 
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under the international law of the sea.”  
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roughly correspond to the equidistant line between the islands and the North Korean 
coastline. 
 
This invariably raises the question of how baselines are defined under the UNCLOS. As 
mentioned above, Article 3 determines that the territorial sea of a State shall be measured 
from its baseline, and Article 15 indicates the baseline as the element on which the 
equidistant line shall be based. Article 4 defines the baseline as follows: 
“Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.”378 
 
While this would result in a line very accurately following the coastal structure, such a 
degree of accuracy is hardly needed when it comes to delimitating ocean boundaries. 
Therefore, Article 7 introduces the straight baseline as a more practical basis for delimiting 
territorial sea and equidistant lines: 
“(1) In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”379  
 
“(3) The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent form 
the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters.“380 
 
“(6) The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as 
to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone.”381 
 
The above Paragraphs offer important insights into the process of delimiting ocean 
boundaries in general and the NLL in case in particular. One the one hand, Paragraph (1) 
defines the matter of straight baselines, which are imperative in determining any maritime 
                                                 
378 UNCLOS Article 4. United Nations (1982): United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN 
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delimitation, but especially when it comes to identifying an equidistant line, as it provides 
for the inclusion of geographic formations characteristic to a certain coast, including islands, 
into the process. On the other hand, it postulates that such islands which could be taken 
account of in establishing a straight baseline need to be in the immediate vicinity of the 
coast of the State the baseline of which is being determined. 
 
Paragraph (3) is of equal interest, stipulating that the straight baseline should in principle 
not decisively deviate from the direction of a State’s coast. A quick look at a map of the 
Yellow Sea, however, shows that the Northwest Islands are neither in the close vicinity of 
the Korean coast, which should be the subject of drawing the baseline, nor does the NLL, 
and therefore the straight baseline which, as a purported median line, it has to be based on 
in some way, seem to comply with the requirements of Paragraph (3).  
 
Paragraph (6) suggests that, even if the NLL was based on a straight baseline in coherence 
with the UNCLOS, it could be argued that the line contradicts international law in so far as 
it cuts the North Korean coast off from both the high seas and the 200nm Exclusive 
Economic Zone claimed by the DPRK. 382 
 
Examining these findings, it is quite clear that the legality of the NLL in fact hinges on the 
question whether or not the Northwest Islands can or should be considered, as they are at 
the moment, when establishing a straight baseline, which can then in turn serve as the basis, 
in conjunction with the straight baseline established on the North Korean coast, of a an 
equidistant median line to delimitate both sides’ territorial seas. As discussed, the UNCLOS 
stipulates for islands to be accorded the same territorial sea as a mainland body. 
Furthermore, it provides certain criteria to base the decision whether or not a formation 
should be accounted for in establishing a straight baseline on. Nevertheless, in a contested 
case such as the NLL, where one side – South Korea – claims the straight baseline should 
be established in a manner which the other side – North Korea – claims to violate its 
territorial waters, the UNCLOS by its own will not be able to provide the parties with a 
satisfactory clarification, making judicial arbitration in interpreting the applicability of the 
convention necessary. 
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6.3 Considering adjudication in accordance with international law 
If the two sides were to decide to consider a settlement of the dispute necessary but were 
unable to come to a mutually agreeable solution amongst themselves, the question could be 
referred by them to the ICJ for formal adjucation. The question what results such adjucation 
would lead to is indeed an interesting one, given that, as Van Dyke, Valencia, and Miller 
Garmendia correctly note that “although the Court has attempted to articulate consistent 
governing principles, its approach to each dispute submitted to it has, in fact, been more 
akin to the approach of an arbitrator than that of a judge.”383 The ICJ seems to share this 
understanding of its role in bringing about solutions to delimitation disputes, as in 2009 in a 
judgement it noted, “the object of delimitation is to achieve a delimitation that is equitable, 
not an equal apportionment of maritime areas.”384 
 
However, similarities between cases can be traced and a comparison of similar cases could 
lead to an idea on how adjudication of the NLL dispute by the ICJ might look like. In this 
context, one particularly interesting case is the ICJ’s 2009 decision on the Black Sea 
maritime delimitation between Romania and Ukraine. 
 
In 2004, Romania had filed an application as to institute proceedings against Ukraine on the 
issue, as negotiations agreed upon in a bilateral treaty had not brought any conclusions.385 
The area in question was in the north-western portion of the Black Sea, near the Danube 
Delta, and the two parties had failed to come to an agreement as to the delimitation of their 
Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf. In general, the case would not share too 
many similarities with the Korean case, but one element made it a particularly good 
example of how the ICJ might evaluate conditions in the Yellow Sea: Serpents’ Island a 
relatively small uninhabited rock, about 20nm to the northeast of the Danube Delta, was 
considered a main point of disagreement between the parties. 386  While Romania had 
proposed a line running fairly close around the island and then continuing towards the 
central area of the sea, Ukraine had advocated a delimitation taking Serpents’ Island into 
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consideration, resulting in a line running southwards significantly closer to the Romanian 
coast. 
 
In the judgement, the Court outlined its approach to a delimitation issue such as the present 
case: 
“First, the Court will establish a provisional delimitation line, using methods that are 
geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in which the 
delimitation is to take place. … So far as opposite coasts are concerned, the provisional 
delimitation line will consist of a median line between the two coasts. … Equidistance 
and median lines are to be constructed from the most appropriate points on the coasts 
of the two States concerned, with particular attention being paid to those protuberant 
coastal points situated nearest to the area to be delimitated.”387 
 
The Court goes on to explain, 
“The course of the final line should result in an equitable solution (Articles 74 and 83 
of the UNCLOS). Therefore, the Court will at the next, second stage consider whether 
there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance 
line in order to achieve an equitable result. … Finally, and at the third stage, the Court 
will verify that the line (a provisional equidistance line which may or may not have 
been adjusted by taking into account the relevant circumstances) does not, as it stands, 
leas to an inequitable result by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of 
the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each 
State by reference to the delimitation line. … This is not to suggest that these respective 
areas should not be proportionate to coastal lengths – as the Court has said ‘the sharing 
out of the area is therefore the consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa’”388 
 
This listing of proceedings is interesting in so far as it very well illustrates the steps the ICJ 
would take in an equally manner when adjudicating the Korean case. It should be noted, 
however, that the case Romania vs. Ukraine refers to the delimitation of the States’ 
Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf, as opposed to the territorial sea which 
would be the object of delimitation in the Yellow Sea. The Articles 74 and 83 of the 
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UNCLOS mentioned by the Court refer to the principle of equitable solution with regards 
to delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf only. However, Article 
15 discussed on the previous pages prescribes a similar option when considering two 
States’ territorial seas. 
 
For the purposes of observing similarities between the Romania vs. Ukraine case and a 
hypothetical Korea vs. Korea case, the most important decision of the court is to be found 
in the selection of base points. With regards to Serpents’ Island, the ICJ noted, 
“Serpents’ Island calls for specific attention in the determination of the provisional 
equidistance line. … the Court observes that there have been instances when coastal 
islands have been considered part of a State’s coast, in particular when a coast is made 
up of a cluster of fringe islands. Thus in one maritime delimitation arbitration, an 
international tribunal placed base points lying on the low water line of certain fringe 
islands considered to constitute par of the very coastline of one of the parties.”389 
 
These deliberations of the ICJ seem to strengthen the South Korean case that the ‘fringe’ of 
the Northwest Islands could be considered part of the South’s coast and should thus be 
considered as base points/points of the straight baseline when establishing an equidistant 
line. Indeed the above citation proves that the ICJ finds such an arrangement possible. 
However, it should be noted that the case the Court referred to in above citation, Eritrea vs. 
Yemen, included a boundary dispute in a very narrow area of the Red Sea. The islands 
which were considered as part of the coastline were referred to as “‘carpet’ of some 350 
islands and islets, which both Parties were agreed are an integral part of Eritrea’s mainland 
coast.”390 Therefore, the situation is hardly comparable to the Northwest Islands area. It is 
instead more helpful to see how the ICJ continues to qualify Serpents’ Island in Romania vs. 
Ukraine, 
“To count Serpents’ Island as a relevant part of the coast would amount to grafting an 
extraneous element onto Ukraine’s coastline; the consequence would be a judicial 
refashioning of geography, which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation 
                                                 
389 Ibid. p16 
390 Kwiatkowska, Barbara (2000): “The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of 
Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, in IBRU Boundary and Security 
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authorizes. The Court is thus of the view that Serpents’ Island cannot be taken to form 
part of Ukraine’s coastal configuration.”391 
 
In the end, the ICJ decided that while the delimitation of the two States’ Exclusive 
Economic Zones and continental shelf would have to be diverted in the waters near 
Serpents’ Island in order not to violate the 12nm territorial sea which was attributed to the 
island, but that otherwise the island would not have any influence whatsoever on the 
drawing of the final delimitating line. 
 
The above example shows how the Yellow Sea dispute between the ROK and DPRK would 
probably be treated by the ICJ if it was referred to it. South Korea’s claim to utilize the 
Northwest Islands in drawing a delimitating line would probably not be upheld, given they 
more resemble part of the DPRK’s coast than the South’s. However, paying due to the 
principle of equitable solution, or as it would be referred to with regards to territorial seas 
being the subject, other special circumstances as referred to in Article 15 of the UNCLOS, 
the Court could very well agree with the South that the islands face special security 
requirements which the Court would probably consider in its ruling. 
 
However, actual realization of such court procedures are not very probable to take place in 
the near future. As Terence Roehrig contends, “South Korea will never allow the dispute to 
go before an international tribunal until there were some improvements in the overall 
security environment.” 392 Equally, as Kotch and Abbey point out, Pyongyang is also not 
too eager to even negotiate the issue with the South, “fearing that bilateral negotiations with 
Seoul would violate its longstanding strategy of resolving outstanding security issues on the 
peninsula only with the United States.”393 In addition, as long as the two Koreas adhere to 
their self-conception of existing under ‘Special Relations’, even while they are both full UN 
Member States, they are highly unlikely to consider bringing what they consider an internal 
issue before an international court. The most important difference, however, between the 
two Koreas and Romania and Ukraine in the example case, is the notion that Romania and 
Ukraine were in explicit agreement that they would consult the ICJ in case they could not 
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bring about a settlement themselves. In the meantime, North and South Korea don’t even 
seem to be able to agree whether or not a settlement should at all be sought. 
 
7. Position and justifications of the parties to the NLL 
As mentioned above, both North and South Korea invoke different legal provisions and 
instruments to emphasize and justify their claims. While the South points to the 1953 
Armistice Agreement as legal basis of the NLL, which delimitates territory put under the 
South’s control as part of the Armistice agreement, which it maintains the UNC at the time 
signed the agreement on behalf of all states participating under UNC including the ROK394, 
the DPRK refutes this and states that the NLL was drawn by US forces and is simply 
illegal.395  
 
Instead, the North rather points to the 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonagression 
and Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) which calls for settlement of disputes 
through mutual agreement. Article 10 states that, 
“South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, any 
differences of views and disputes arising between them.”396 
 
The Basic Agreement’s Protocol on Implementation and Observance of Chapter 2: 
Nonagression, which was developed along with other protocols following the Basic 
Agreement, explicitly stipulates,  
“Discussions regarding the South-North sea demarcation line of nonaggression shall 
continue. Until the decision on the maritime demarcation line is final, the 
nonaggression areas of the sea shall be those that have been followed by each side until 
the present time.”397  
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While this would at last provide a legal basis on which to build at least inter-Korean 
negotiations on the NLL on, the Basic Agreements and its protocols never went into full 
effect, again leaving the Armistice Agreement as the only legal document really covering 
the relationship between the two sides.398 
 
One argument heavily promoted by South Korea 399  and readily picked up by many 
observers400 is that the North had tacitly accepted the NLL as a military demarcation for 
twenty years and as long as it served its purposes, thereby implicitly legitimizing it as the 
maritime border.401 The ROK also alleges that in 1959, a DPRK yearbook contained a map 
of the Yellow Sea area which clearly depicted the NLL, which it maintains would show the 
North’s explicit agreement of the NLL.402 
 
The DPRK on the other hand maintains the NLL was unilaterally drawn by the UNC, and 
that it had originally declared a territorial sea breadth of 12nm.403 Furthermore, the North 
argues it protested against the line at several occasions, including in 1955.404 In 1999 it 
proposed an alternative line, drawn as a continuation of the MDL on land and largely 
corresponding to the hypothetical equidistant line if the Northwest Islands are 
disregarded. 405 In that model the Northwest Islands would have been connected to the 
South’s waters through two corridors. (See Map 2 in Annex I) In response, the ROK claims 
that the UNCLOS would allow for severe security interests to be taken into account when 
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drawing a maritime delimitation along on the basis of an equidistant line, thus rendering the 
North’s proposal unusable and illegal.406 
 
Both sides claim a number of justifications for their respective positions on the NLL. 
Largely contradicting each other, they show the complexity of the situation and suggest that 
hopes for a solution based on inter-Korean agreement are presently probably as far from 
reality as the possibility of formal adjudication. At the same time, however, by indicating 
the priorities of the parties, these justifications also provide an idea of how the two sides 
might eventually come to an arrangement and what such an agreement could possibly look 
like, the DPRK’s proposal for a maritime boundary further to the south, but with the 
provision for the Northwest Islands to remain connected to the South through guaranteed 
channels, being a good example. 
 
 
8. Proposals for a peaceful solution 
With both sides staunchly defending their own positions as unalterable principles, proposals 
for a solution have been few, often being restricted to individual concession such as the 
limited opening of train tracks across the DMZ. More successful were efforts in economic 
cooperation such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The idea of a ‘peace zone’ or 
‘economic cooperation zone’ for the Yellow Sea had been floated from time to time, but it 
was a contentious issue not only in inter-Korean talks but especially in the South Korean 
domestic political landscape.407 When President Roh and Kim Jong-il at the 2007 inter-
Korean meeting agreed on a number of joint initiatives, including a ‘special peace and 
cooperation zone in the West Sea’ which would mean establishing a joint fishing zone and 
maritime peace zone and a special economic zone as well as promoting civilian traffic over 
the NLL and use of the Han river estuary408, this agglomeration of initiatives all in more or 
less adjacent areas had the potential to become a snowball-like momentum for more and 
more institutionalized cooperation. However, amidst domestic flack upon his return to the 
South which would not stop until he had handed over his office, Roh-Moo Hyun was 
unable to live up to the agreements made. Neither was the North though who took a more 
                                                 
406 ROK Ministry of Defense (2002): “The Republic Korea Position Regarding the Northern Limit Line”, on 
http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm, 04.12.2011 
407 International Crisis Group (2010): “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea” (=Crisis Group 
Asia Report No. 198) pp12-14 
408 Ibid. p14 
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hard-line stance before the joint meetings which should have negotiated the technical 
details of the agreed initiatives. When the talks were over in the end of 2007, none of the 
initiatives had been brought any closer to realization.409 
 
Joint projects on economic cooperation have good potential of surviving crises on the 
peninsula, as the Kaesong Industrial Complex shows. Because of their potential 
profitability, they also stand a better chance of actually being implemented than strictly 
political initiatives. However, they usually have a deficiency, which is the fact that the side 
reaching out further has in general more to lose, rendering threats and threat perceptions an 
almost insurmountable obstacle for both long-term functionality and, more important 
projection to areas outside the economic realm such as a political or social dimension.  
 
For a number of reasons discussed in the earlier chapter, the DMZ has over the decades 
stood out as a relatively stable factor on the peninsula, despite several incidents coming 
close to escalating the tensed situation. While the DMZ is a very special institution shaped 
by long years of partition, one of its easier reproducible aspects is the internationalization of 
the area. As has been argued before, international observers, though largely reviled on the 
peninsula can play an important role in moderating threat perceptions, and it might be 
worth it to formulate a simplistic proposal for a peace zone which could, through 
international supervision, escape from the dilemma of threat and threat perception reigning 
on the peninsula. 
 
This proposal is by no means be an accurate description of the steps likely to follow in 
actual terms, being rather based largely on assumptions. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a 
result of the preceding analyses and arguments, interpreting them in a way which shows 
what might be realistically possible in bringing the two sides to a settlement of the dispute. 
 
Thie proposal is based on the following basic assumptions: The two sides are aware that 
without a solution to the NLL dispute open conflict is likely to happen which is not 
desirable; therefore, the two sides are willing to solve the dispute by peaceful means, but 
have so far been prevented by a lack of trust; and finally that the international community is 
willing to actively participate in bringing about a solution. In short, the proposal would 
involve a non-combat controlled zone, a ‘Yellow Sea Maritime Demilitarized Zone 
                                                 
409 Ibid. p15 
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(YSMDZ)’, which would include the area north and, to a larger part, south of the present 
NLL. This imbalance is necessitated by the closeness of the NLL to North Korea’s coast. In 
the future, the YSMDZ could also include the Northwest Islands. The YSMDZ would very 
much correspond to the modalities, mutatis mutandis, of the DMZ, with strictly regulated 
troop strengths on both sides in certain areas controlled by an international force under UN 
mandate. However, as one major difference, it should be open to civilian economic activity, 
most likely fishery. While such an international mandate would have to be of strictly 
neutral and non-aggressive nature, it would require large resources in order to effectively 
patrol the area, including the sub-marine area. The YSMDZ can however not be a long- or 
medium-term solution. Instead, it is established to build trust between the parties and 
establish an effective non-combat zone around the islands, preventing incidents which have 
in the past lead to heightened tensions. In this new climate of trust, the two parties may find 
themselves able to sincerely negotiate for a solution including the cession of rights by either 
side, eventually coming to a long-term settlement without the need for large scale 
international control. Such a long-term solution could very likely be built on the North’s 
proposed alternative demarcation line, but with a broader solution for Southern connection 
to its five islands. 
 
Such a solution would probably be a breakthrough with wider implications for the Korean 
peninsula, bringing about a climate of trust and commitment conducive to a wider 
settlement. However, the obstacles are many. Amongst others, YSMDZ would have to 
overcome the facts that its model, the DMZ on land has often not been able to prevent 
clashes, and that in almost sixty years, it has been rather a point of tension than bringing 
additional trust conducive to a wider solution of conflict. Also, patrolling of the sea area 
would require heavy resources from the international community, with commitment from 
stakeholders such as China being questionable. Nevertheless, this solution represents a 
compromise which, after careful analysis of the situation, could under certain circumstances 
be a realistic scenario.  
 
8 Conclusion 
The NLL remains a controversial issue, both for the two Koreas and among the 
international community. Stakes are high, as past and present clashes, including such with 
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loss of life, have shown. Besides security issues, economic interests repeatedly drive the 
countries in the region to violate the NLL and push for its alteration or perpetuation 
respectively. The above analysis shows that while historic reasons and wider issues of 
Korean partition played an important part in bringing about the situation, it is today largely 
based on the security dilemma the two states find themselves in. This is most vividly 
characterized by a fundamental lack of trust, preventing a settlement on the NLL and 
therefore a wider solution for the peninsula. Its potential as a catalyst for a wider settlement 
however also shows the dangers of the NLL leading to larger scale conflict if it remains 
unsolved in the years and decades to come.  
 
The crucial question remains whether the two sides can overcome the fundamental lack of 
trust in a manner allowing for other differences and disputes to be put aside and concentrate 
on the first step of solving the NLL issue. Given the way the NLL dispute is connected to 
other aspects of the Korean situation, such a step would require much more than simply 
finding a solution which theoretically creates a win-win situation, benefiting both sides. It 
would require an act of reconsideration by both sides of the very issues which have shaped 
their mutual relations for the last sixty years, such as historical differences and ideological 
ones. It would also require strong and unified commitment by the international community, 
preventing the partisan involvement in inter-Korean affairs which for such a long time 
already has been wrought on the peninsula.  Such commitment however, is not very likely 
given the different perceptions of major stakeholder about an ‘ideal’ future Korea. A strong 
and unified commitment including the provision of resources from the international 
community on the issue is less than certain.  
 
On 19 December 2011, Korean state media announced the death of Kim Jong-il, who had 
led the Korean people since his father’s death in 1994.410 While he himself as well as his 
policy-making apparatus had long been inaccessible and secretive to outside observers, his 
death, though not fully unexpected, only further thickens the fog of North Korean policy 
decisions. While in the days after Kim’s death, the countries powerful institutions seemed 
to put their weight behind the youngest son and chosen successor, Kim Jong-un, no one can 
                                                 
410 Choe, Sang-Hun, Sanger, David E. (2011): “Kim Jong-il, North Korean Dictator, Dies”, New York Times 
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predict whether he can keep such tight control over the country as his father had obviously 
been able to do. 
 
A peaceful solution to the NLL dispute did not seem very probable in the months prior to 
this transfer in power, but now it seems even further out of reach. Unfortunately, the 
interconnectedness of NLL and inter-Korean relations in general suggests it is most 
probable that a final settlement on the NLL will not be achievable without a significant 
improvement of these wider relations. When this might happen, however, just got a bit 
harder to tell. 
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Annex I: Maps 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Location of the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula.  
 
Source: Modified by author to emphasize 38th parallel, based on United Nations map. 
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Map 2: Yellow Sea, NLL, Northwest Islands 
 
Source: International Crisis Group (2010): “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North 
Korea” (=Crisis Group Asia Report No. 198) p39 
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Annex III: Abstracts 
English 
The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is a part of one of the world’s most persistent, most 
dangerous, most actual and yet most interesting conflicts. Since World War II have the two 
Koreas been facing each other, separated by nothing but a four kilometre wide strip of land 
and, surprisingly, a still quite ambiguously defined maritime boundary. This boundary, the 
NLL is the subject of this study, which attempts to approach an analysis from different 
dimensions. First, the history of the NLL, as part of the wider Korean conflict is retraced in 
order to observe how historical factors have influenced both its development and the 
present wider Korean situation it is part of. Second, a theoretical approach tries to clarify 
the how certain actors are influenced by how they perceive the world around them, which 
finds its most explicit expression in the Security Dilemma present on the peninsula. Third, 
the present situation on the Korean peninsula is examined in to observe how different 
aspects, one of them the NLL, interrelate and mutually influence each other. Also, different 
factors influencing the NLL dispute itself are examined. The fourth dimension tries to 
establish a legal framework for a possible settlement of the NLL dispute. In the end, there is 
a simplified attempt to draw up a possible scenario for peaceful settlement of the dispute. 
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German 
Die Northern Limit Line (NLL) ist Teil eines der hartnäckigsten, gefährlichsten, aktuellsten 
und dennoch interessantesten Konflikten der heutigen Welt. Seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 
stehen sich die beiden Koreas feindlich gegenüber, getrennt voneinander durch nichts als 
eine vier Kilometer breite entmilitarisierte Zone, sowie einer überraschenderweise auch 
nach all den Jahren noch sehr ungenau definierten Seegrenze. Diese Seegrenze, die NLL, 
ist das Forschungssubjekt dieser Studie, welche versucht sich der Thematik auf 
verschiedenen Ebenen anzunähern. Zuerst wird die Geschichte der NLL als Teil des 
gesamten Koreanischen Konfliktes nachgezeichnet um zu beobachten wie geschichtliche 
Faktoren sowohl ihre eigene Entwicklung, wie auch die gegenwärtige Situation Koreas, 
deren Teil sie ist, beeinflussen. Zweitens wird versucht über einen theoretischer Ansatz zu 
klären, wie relevante Akteure durch ihre Sicht der Welt beeinflusst werden, was sich auf 
der Koreanischen Halbinsel am deutlichsten in Form eines akuten Sicherheitsdilemmas 
niederschlägt. Drittens wird die gegenwärtige Situation Koreas untersucht um zu 
beobachten wie verschiedene Faktoren, inklusive der NLL, in Verbindung stehen und sich 
gegenseitig beeinflussen. Zudem werden verschieden Faktoren welche die NLL besonders 
beeinflussen beleuchtet. Die vierte Ebene versucht, ein rechtliches Rahmenwerk für eine 
mögliche Beilegung des Streits um die NLL zu erfassen. Schließlich findet sich noch der 
vereinfachte Versuch, ein mögliches Szenario für eine friedliche Beilegung zu erstellen. 
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